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ABSTRACT 
Since the onset of the economic crisis, Zimbabwe has developed a very vibrant 
informal sector. Due to the closure of numerous industries, many have lost their jobs 
in the formal sector and as a means of survival, have had to engage with the informal 
economy. Various scholars have stated that the informal sector has become the 
unofficial backbone of the economy. However, with the formation of the unity 
Government in February 2009, the new Government is committed to national 
reconstruction leading to sustainable development. Therefore, the aim of this 
research is to highlight the importance of the informal sector as one of the tools that 
can be used to drive economic growth in the country. As a sector that has played a 
fundamental role in the country since 1990, this research aims to locate this sector in 
the current debates in the ongoing reconstruction process and make the link 
between the informal sector and sustainable development. 
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CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
1.1 Introduction  
Bond and Saunders state that ‘when Zimbabwe attained its first independent Government 
in 1980, there were reasons to hope for a bright future. The country inherited significant 
infrastructure from the prior Rhodesian settler regime, including relatively modern 
transportation and communications systems and an impressive set of import substitution 
industries. The economy had been built with extensive state support and planning to evade 
UN sanctions (under the Ian Smith regime).’1 But by 1991, the economy was beginning to 
show signs of distress and by 2000 a country once praised for its phenomenal education 
sector, rapid industrialisation, and steady economic growth among other things was on the 
brink of collapse. That is, ‘once the breadbasket of Southern Africa with a relatively high 
standard of living in comparison to many of the other sub-Saharan African countries, 
Zimbabwe has been laid to waste by gross economic mismanagement and corruption that 
has pauperised the population and brought about a breakdown of essential social services.’2 
 
The second draft of the Zimbabwe Emergency Recovery Program (ZERP), mentions that the 
economic meltdown has been characterised by the following features: ‘economic activity 
continues to contract and to move to the informal sector, real Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) is projected to have fallen by over 6% in 2007, driven by output declines in all sectors3 
… Inflation has spiralled to very high levels … many of the goods with controlled prices are 
not regularly available anymore in the formal sector … official figures put inflation at 11 
million percent at the end of May 2008 and 231 million percent in July 2008.’4 In addition, 
‘frequent electricity shortages, deteriorating infrastructure, fuel and foreign exchange 
                                                             
1 Bond, P and Saunders, R., ‘Labour, the State, and the Struggle for a Democratic Zimbabwe,’ in Monthly 
Review Journal, Dec 2005, p. 42. 
2 Financial Standards Foundation., ‘Country Brief: Zimbabwe,’ in eStandards Forum, New York, Oct 2009, p. 1. 
3 ‘Some of the main indicators quoted on how industry has been negatively affected are 60% decline in GDP, 
90% decline in industry capacity utilisation, 75% decline in gold production, US$ 4 billion in foreign debt, 
monetary supply of 51.769%, quasi fiscal losses of US$ 2.5 billion, 70% of money out of official circulation’ 
(Multi-Donor Trust Fund, Sept 2008, p. 11). 
4 Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF)., Zimbabwe Emergency Recovery Program: Draft 2, Harare, Sept 2008, p. 6. 
10 | P a g e  
 
shortages, the rising impact of the substantial emigration of skilled workers and 
uncertainties over property rights have contributed to the decline.’5 
 
In 2008, industry was reported to be at 22.6%, services accounted for 59.3%, and agriculture 
and fishing had an 18% share. Between 1999 and 2008, the economy declined at an annual 
average rate of 6.3%. This compares to ‘increases of 3.9% for South Africa, 5.9% for 
Botswana, and 7.7% for Mozambique.’6 According to the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the per capita income in 2008 was US$ 268 [and] Zimbabwe was ranked 176 out of 
180 nations and territories the organisation compiles per capita data for. The United 
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) ‘estimated that as of 
the end of 2008, only 6% of the workforce was formally employed.’7 Thus the shrinking 
economy has grossly reduced employment opportunities and the unemployment rate has 
increased to more than 50% in the early 2000s and estimated between 80% - 94% between 
2007/2008.8 
 
It is within this context that Zimbabwe has developed a very vibrant informal sector. Due to 
the closure of numerous industries, many have lost their jobs in the formal sector and as a 
means of survival have had to engage the informal sector. Makaye and Munhande state 
that, ‘a retrospective analysis of Zimbabwe’s informal sector reveals that at independence, 
the informal sector accounted for less than 10% of the labour force. However, as time went 
on, with mass education, demand for formal employment increased rapidly against a 
backdrop of a gradually declining economy, resulting in about 4 million Zimbabweans 
earning their livelihood in the informal sector by 2005.’ 9 In year 2000, an estimated 400 
companies were closed and within 18 months an additional 700 had shutdown. Various 
                                                             
5 Loc cit.  
6 Financial Standards Foundation., Op.cit, p. 5. 
7 Loc cit. 
8 Dekker, M., ‘Livelihoods and economic crisis: the case of smallholder farmers in Zimbabwe (1999-2008),’ in 
Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford, Oxford, Mar 2009, p. 1. 
9 Tibaijuka in Makaye, P and Munhande, C., ‘The Contribution of Informal Food Trading to Urban Food Security 
in Zimbabwe: The Case of Gweru 2000-2007,’ in Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, Vol. 10, No. 2, 
2008,  p. 312. 
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analysts observed that informal sector employment had surpassed formal employment with 
only about 2.7 million of the 6.7 million working adults still being employed.10 
 
The informal sector in Zimbabwe like in most developing states provides more than half of 
the employment. For instance, ‘informal employment makes up 48% of non-agricultural 
employment in North Africa, 51% in Latin America, 65% in Asia, and 72% in sub-Saharan 
Africa. When agricultural employment is included, the percentages rise in some countries 
like India and many sub-Saharan African countries beyond 90%. Estimates for developed 
countries are around 15%.’11 Therefore, ‘due to hyper-inflation and government policies of 
price controls, many formal businesses are closing operations and laying off staff. Harare’s 
large industrial zone shows severe decline, and the informal trading economy has surfaced 
to take advantage of distortions generated by government policies. This informal sector fills 
some of the void left by the decline of the formal sector.’12 
 
Makaye and Munhande further state that the informal sector covers a wide range of market 
activities combining two groups which are different in nature. The first group consists of 
families and individuals who use the informal sector as a coping mechanism in a harsh 
earning environment. The second is comprised of small, micro and medium entrepreneurs 
who view the harsh economic environment as an opportunity to escape state regulations.13 
Goods provided by the informal sector range from basic necessities such as cooking oil, soap 
and bread to luxury items. For instance, informal food traders in Gweru provide a variety of 
food commodities ranging from grain products, drinks, fruits, vegetables, and processed 
foods.14 In addition, the informal sector includes cross border traders who are 
predominantly women and survivalists who bring in goods like clothing, artwork and crafts 
and even foreign currency. Also, remittances from Zimbabwean Diaspora through unofficial 
                                                             
10 Ibid. p. 315. 
11 Ibid. p. 314. 
12 Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF)., Op.cit, p. 11. 
13 Makaye, P and Munhande, C., Op.cit, p. 314. 
14 Ibid. p. 322. 
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and informal channels, has come to be a great source of revenue for most households in 
Zimbabwe. 
 
According to Mupedziswa, ‘remittances now constitute a major global business particularly 
in the developing world where countries are struggling to mobilise foreign currency for 
everyday use (this is especially true for Latin America, Africa and Asia.’15 He further 
mentions that ‘World Bank official estimates put the volume of international remittances at 
a massive US$ 75 billion, while the total remitted globally in 2001 was a staggering US$ 100 
billion. The figures have continued to grow steadily indicating the growing importance of 
remittances in the global economy. Interestingly, in 2001, remittances generally exceeded 
Official Development Assistance … An estimated US$ 4 million has been brought into 
Zimbabwe daily by export labour and cross border trading.’16 Thus, the informal economy is 
a significant feature in the country’s current make up. 
 
At the beginning of 2009, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) legalised the use of hard 
currency indicating a shift by the RBZ toward economic liberalisation and slowing quasi-
fiscal operations. This has attracted income generation back into the formal economy 
especially in sectors such as mining where illegal informal operations were occurring. With 
the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) on 11 February 2009, the new 
Government is committed to national reconstruction leading to sustainable development. In 
March 2009, the new Minister of Finance, Tendai Biti, announced the Short Term 
Emergency Recovery Program (STERP) mainly targeted at reinstating fiscal discipline and 
providing the basis for a revival of productivity.17 As the GNU begins the process of national 
reconstruction, the informal sector should carefully be integrated in broader economic 
discussions and policies.  
                                                             
15 Mupedziswa, R., ‘Diaspora Dollars and Social Development: Remittance Patterns of Zimbabwe Nationals 
based in South Africa,’ in Global Development Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3-4, Winter 2008 – Summer 2009,  p. 229-
272. 
16 Ibid. p. 7-8.  
17 Doran, S., ‘Zimbabwe’s Economy: A Report Card, mid-2009,’ in Brenthurst Discussion Paper 8, Brenthurst 
Foundation, Johannesburg, Oct 2009, p. 4. 
13 | P a g e  
 
 
Therefore, this research intends to highlight the importance of the IS as one of the tools that 
can be used to drive economic growth in the country. This chapter will provide the 
theoretical and analytical framework that has informed this research. Chapter 2 will give a 
historical overview of Zimbabwe’s informal sector which is to be understood within the 
macro-economic environment of the country. Chapter 3 considers the informal sector as an 
engine of growth and development in Zimbabwe considering the potential that this sector 
possesses. Chapter 4 will locate the IS in the current debates on reconstruction and make 
the link between the informal sector and sustainable development. 
 
1.2 Aim 
Zimbabwe is a country that in recent years has developed a very vibrant informal sector. 
This has been due to the economic meltdown as a result of18: 
A failed attempt at Economic Structural Adjustment (1991-1995) which led to 
contraction of the civil service, the collapse of the domestic industrial sector and 
massive layoffs, a bitterly disputed fast track land reform programme (since 2000) …, 
cash hand outs to appease grievances of war veterans in 1997 sparking an 
inflationary spiral, military intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo leading 
to budgetary constraints and overspending.19 
A Pambuzuka news article (2006) mentions that, ‘structural adjustment policies in the late 
1980s and early 1990s … significantly contributed towards a rapid growth of the informal 
economy in many African countries. These policies encouraged governments to liberalise 
trade, to privatise state-owned enterprises and to reduce the size of the public sector. This 
                                                             
18 ‘There have been contesting explanations for the origins of Zimbabwe’s crisis. Economist Rob Davies – may 
put the date of crisis in 1997, but turns immediately to blame wealth accumulation – a peculiarly rampant 
form of absolute extraction by the ruling ZANU-PF… For David Moore, the Marxist notion of accumulation 
better captures that particular process … For the USAID, the country’s deep economic crisis is the result of 
Governments flawed economic and public management policies’ (Bond, P., Apr 2007, p. 150). 
19 United Nations, ‘The Urbanisation, Housing and Local Governance Crisis in Zimbabwe,’ in 
http://www.saprn.org.za/documents/d0001387, last visited 08 May 2009, p. 22-3. 
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led to sharp decline in employment in the formal sector and forced many to survive in highly 
precarious and insecure conditions in the informal economy.20 
 
In the case of Zimbabwe, the 1990s represented a difficult period for the country. 
Unemployment rose from 10% in 1980 to 40% in 1990. Government introduced the 
Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP)21 as a way to curb unsustainable fiscal 
deficits, falling tax revenues and declining productivity,22 but ESAP failed miserably. Bond 
and Saunders state that ‘the results were disastrous. Manufacturing output declined by 40% 
from 1991 to 1995, accompanied by a similar decline in worker’s real standard of living and 
a dramatic increase in inflation that ravaged savings and those in the informal economy.’23 
The situation was worsened by droughts that occurred in 1992 and 1995. In 1995 the 
economy was slowly beginning to disintegrate. In 1997, the pay-outs to the war veterans 
which included an upfront payment of approximately US$ 6 000 and ZW$ 2 000 per month 
had far reaching macro-economic implications.24 These large pay-outs to the liberation 
struggle heroes were immediately followed by Zimbabwe’s involvement in the Great Lakes 
conflict. 
 
Qobo states that ‘Zimbabwe took the lead in involving SADC … Zimbabwe committed an 
initial contingent of 6 000 soldiers to the war, the number increasing eventually to about 13 
000 … costing an estimated US$ 1 million a day.’25 These two events had a direct bearing on 
the country’s economy pushing it to the brink of collapse. In year 2000: 
The fast track land reform programme … resulted in aid cutbacks and stringent 
borrowing measures being imposed by international financial organisations … The 
economic shock was compounded in 2003 when a widespread shortage of cash in 
                                                             
20 Pambuzuka news., ‘Africa Forces for Change – Informal Economy Organisations in Africa,’ in 
http://www.pambuzuka.org/en/category/development/34766, 31 May 2006 last visited 18 Nov 2009, p. 1. 
21 ‘ESAP was introduced by the then Finance Minister Bernard Chidzero and a very small group of technocrats. 
The key documents were prepared by the World Bank in 1987’ (Bond, P., Apr 2007, p. 167). 
22 Qobo, M., ‘Outlines of Intra-state Conflict in Zimbabwe and Regional Challenges, in 
http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-132675-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html, last visited 18 Nov 2009, p. 11. 
23 Bond, P and Saunders, R., Op.cit, p. 43.  
24 Qobo, M., Op.cit, p. 11. 
25 Ibid. p. 11-2. 
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banks eroded confidence in the banking system. The combination of these factors, 
including the disruption of the agricultural sector,26 a major foreign currency earner, 
coupled with President Mugabe’s alienation of the West, brought a crippling 
shortage of foreign currency, basic goods and hyper-inflation. The picture was further 
complicated in mid-2005 when the Government undertook a cleanup campaign 
termed Operation Restore Order/Operation Murambatsvina leaving approximately 
300 000 people with no homes and at least 80% of the population below the poverty 
datum line.27 
 
The culmination of these factors has resulted in the informal sector forming the core of 
Zimbabwe’s economic activity. Chibisa and Sigauke state that, ‘post-2000 the informal 
sector had become the “lifeblood” of the nation.’28 As a result, large sections of the 
population have been forced to engage in this sector because it has become a means of 
survival for many citizens, providing them with livelihoods. That is, ‘when private firms or 
public enterprises are downsized or closed, retrenched workers who do not find alternative 
formal jobs have to turn to the informal economy for work because they cannot afford to be 
unemployed.’29 It should be noted that, ‘the informal economy was always a feature of the 
country since colonial times and Smith’s era … Post-independence; in-formalisation was 
driven by internal migration from rural to urban centres. However, the present rapid growth 
of Zimbabwe’s informal economy coincides with its economic slide and internal political 
conflict. The effects have manifested themselves as a shrinking of the formal productive 
sector of the economy, a rise in unemployment and the growth of informal activities.’30 
                                                             
26 ‘In the past, agriculture has been a key contributor to export earnings – 51% in 2000 … But the land invasions 
that began in 2000 have devastated large scale commercial agriculture with catastrophic knock-on effects. 
Agricultures share of export earnings had fallen to 29% by 2008, production declined by 79% between 2002 
and 2008, and Zimbabwe was judged the most food aid dependent country in the world’ (Doran, S., Oct 2009, 
p. 13). 
27 Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF)., Op.cit, p. 13. 
28 Chibisa, P and Sigauke, C., ‘Impact of Operation Murambatsvina (Restore Order) on Flea Markets in Mutare: 
Implications for Achieving MDG 1 and Sustainable Urban Livelihoods,’ in Journal of Sustainable Development in 
Africa, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2008,  p. 37. 
29 Chen, M., ‘Rethinking the Informal Economy: Linkages with the Formal Economy and the Formal Regulatory 
Environment,’ in UNU-WIDER (conference on Unlocking Human Potential: Linking the Informal and Formal 
Sectors), Helsinki, Finland, 17-18 Sept 2004, p. 7. 
30 Qobo, M., Op.cit, p. 13. 
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Additionally, the informal sector has also become a means of creating wealth and ‘in 
response to inflation or cutbacks in public services, households often need to supplement 
formal sector incomes with informal earnings.’31 Various scholars argue that ‘the growth of 
the informal sector may not entirely be undesirable as it plays an important role in the 
growth, and development of the overall economy.’32 It is important to note that, ‘while 
some activities in the informal sector [can] be legitimately described as illegal, such as 
foreign currency dealing, much of the informal activities involve ordinary people trying to 
make a meagre living from buying and selling fruit, vegetables, clothes, shoes and other 
goods.’33 That is: 
Traditionally, the informal economy was perceived as comprising mainly survivalist 
activities. Various negative aspects were used to describe the informal economy 
ranging from undeclared labour, tax evasion, unregulated enterprises, illegal and 
criminal activity. Nevertheless, the vast majority of informal economy activities 
provide goods and services whose production and distribution are perfectly legal. In 
addition, informal economy activities are not necessarily performed with the 
deliberate intention of evading the payment of taxes or social security contributions, 
or infringing labour legislation or other regulations. The informal economy can 
however include restricted illegal and restricted legal operations or irregular 
operators, but no criminal operators. The informal economy should therefore not be 
confused with the criminal economy.34 
 
Therefore, based on this premise, the aim of this research is to critically analyse the 
contribution that the informal sector can make in Zimbabwe’s current reconstruction 
process.  Over the past 29 years of the country’s independence, ‘the government has come 
up with no less than six economic blue prints including: Transitional National Development 
                                                             
31 Chen, M., Op.cit, p. 4. 
32 Blunch, N, Canagarajah, S and Raju, D., ‘The Informal Sector Revisited: A Synthesis across Space and Time,’ in 
http://www/worldbank.org/sp, July 2001 last visited 08 May 2009, p. 4. 
33 Chibisa, P and Sigauke, C., Op.cit, p. 40. 
34 Becker, K.F., ‘The Informal Economy: Fact Finding Study,’ in SIDA, Department for Infrastructure and 
Economic Cooperation, USA, Mar 2004,  p. 11. 
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Plan, Economic Structural Adjustment Programme, Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and 
Social Transformation, Millennium Economic Recovery Programme launched in 2001, the 
National Economic Development Priority Programme crafted in 2006, the Zimbabwe 
Economic Development Strategy which was supposed to run from 2008-2013, and more 
recently the Short Term Emergency Recovery Program [but] neither [have been] inclusive 
nor pro-poor.’35 Thus, due to the vibrancy and resilience of the informal sector, this research 
aims to show that it can play a fundamental role as the government seeks to rebuild the 
collapsed economy. Furthermore, this research aims to make the link between the IS and 
sustainable development, which is a long term goal that the government seeks to achieve. 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
1. How large is the informal sector in Zimbabwe currently? 
2. How has it emerged or evolved to where we see it today? 
3. What has been the dynamic relationship with “formality”, that is, what gap 
stimulated the growth of the informal sector? 
4. What state interventions, actions or policies made the emergence or strength of the 
informal sector possible? 
5. What are the government’s policies on reconstruction and how does the informal 
sector fit into these discussions? 
6. How can government partner with the informal sector to bring about sustainable 
development? 
 
1.4 Rationale 
According to Blunch et al, the informal sector can be ‘an engine of economic growth and job 
creation’36 thus contributing to overall growth and development of a country’s economy. 
That is, ‘over the last decades, it has become clear that the informal economy has significant 
                                                             
35 Chitambara, P., ‘Zimbabwe’s Development Paradox,’ in 
http://www.fingaz.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id1611:zims-development-
paradox&catid=44:economics-society&Itemid=92, 14 Aug 2009, p. 1. 
36 Blunch, N, Canagarajah, S and Raju, D., Op.cit, p. 5. 
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job and income generation potential.’37 In the 1970s, when the notion of the informal 
economy was “discovered”, various scholars believed that it was marginal, peripheral and 
not linked to industrial capitalist development. Becker states that many believed that the 
informal sector would disappear once these countries achieved a sufficient level of 
economic growth, however, ‘the informal economy has been observed to have a more fixed 
character in countries where incomes and assets are not equitably distributed. It seems that 
if economic growth is not accompanied by improvements in employment levels and income 
distribution, the informal economy grows. The situation is therefore that the informal 
economy is continuously rising in most developing countries, even in rural areas.’38 Thus, in 
most developing continents like Latin America, Asia and Africa, the informal sector cannot 
be viewed as a temporary phenomenon or as peripheral. 
 
Most scholars now believe that the ‘informal economy has the potential to achieve high 
levels of productivity through the dynamic, entrepreneurial character of micro-enterprises 
which comprise this sector … the informal sector is not just a survival mechanism for the 
poor, but a means by which educated and skilled individuals evade income tax.’39 Studies 
have shown that in developing countries the informal sector contributes between 20%-70% 
of the total Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Rather than dying out, the IS has actually 
expanded and is both producer and consumer driven. That is:  
It is producer driven in that some firms that are formerly operated – wholly in the 
formal sector seek to remain competitive through outsourcing key manufacturing, 
marketing and maintenance tasks to businesses operating wholly or partially in the 
informal sector. At the same time, it is driven by consumer demand that the high and 
low ends of the market. At the high end of the market, expanded demand among 
high-income urban-based consumers for custom work has created niches for very 
small enterprises with highly skilled work forces … At the low end of the market, the 
growth in urban-based low-income populations has sparked demand for cheap 
                                                             
37 Becker, K.F., Op.cit, p. 3. 
38 Loc cit. 
39 Sookram, S and Watson, P. K., ‘Small-Business Participation in the Informal Sector of an Emerging Economy,’ 
in Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 44, Issue. 10, Nov 2008,  p. 1. 
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consumer goods and services that only businesses that do not comply with labour 
and work place safety regulations can afford to produce.40 
 
Therefore, the formal sector and the informal sector are inextricably linked. That is, in 
developing countries the informal economy plays a crucial role in providing supplemental 
income or is the primary source of income, employment and supplying goods and services in 
markets that have been ignored. This sector plays an intermediate role that links formal sub-
sectors to consumers.41 In 1990, the informal sector is said to have accounted for 
approximately 25% of the urban jobs in Latin America, 10%-65% in Asia and in 1998 it 
accounted for between 40%-60% of the urban jobs in sub-Saharan Africa. In developing 
countries this has been due to low GDP growth rates, a massive influx of people from rural 
to urban areas in search of employment, structural adjustment programmes, and the 
disintegration of production.42 As a result, in most developing countries, the informal sector 
can be used as a tool to enhance economic growth. This is especially crucial for a country 
like Zimbabwe that is engaged in efforts to rebuild its shattered economy.  
 
In a country like Zimbabwe where the current unemployment rate is estimated at 80%, the 
IS can be used to generate employment and absorb the surplus labour/unlimited supply of 
labour most of whom have lost their jobs in the FS among other things.43 Gilpin states that 
in Zimbabwe, ‘the official economy [has become] irrelevant and a number of informal barter 
systems have developed, based on strong community networks. They allow groups to 
purchase barter essentials (like food and fuel) while hedging against inflation and currency 
depreciation. It is this informal economy that has forestalled full scale economic collapse in 
Zimbabwe … The social infrastructure upon which the informal economy is built is very 
strong because it is based on a level of social trust and a keen determination of real market 
                                                             
40 McClain, R.J, Alexander, S.J and Jones, E.T., ‘Incorporating Understanding of Informal Activity in Natural 
Resource and Economic Development Policy,’ in General Technical Report PNW-GTR-755, United States 
Department of Agriculture, June 2008, p. 8.  
41 Ishengoma, E.K and Kappel, R., ‘Economic Growth and Poverty: Does Formalisation of Informal Enterprises 
Matter?’ in German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) Working Papers, No. 20, April 2006, p. 3-5. 
42 Ibid. p. 5 and 10-11. 
43 Srinivas, H., ‘The Informal Sector and Some Developmental Paradigms,’ in 
http://www.gdrc.org/informal/001-define.html, last visited 08 May 2009, p. 2. 
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conditions. With the right incentive structure and institutional framework, these economic 
relationships could transition to a reformed formal economy with relative ease.’44 
Therefore, the IS can be used as one of the engines that will drive economic growth during 
the current reconstruction process. This research seeks to show the importance of this IS 
and locate it within the larger debates on Zimbabwe’s economy, the reconstruction process 
and sustainable development. 
 
Secondly, this research is important because instead of shunning this sector, the 
government can invest in and partner with this sector, utilising it to its full potential. 
Sookram and Watson observe that ‘there is a positive association between excessive 
government regulation and the size of the informal sector [that is] burdensome government 
regulations augment the size of the informal sector.’45 Centeno and Portes add that ‘the 
state manifests itself in three offices: the regulator, the policeman and the tax collector. 
These three persons have as their responsibility the elaboration of laws, the enforcement of 
those laws, and the collection of payment for their enforcement.’46 They go on to state that 
in the case of weak states like Zimbabwe, ‘they give rise to a vast informal sector precisely 
because ever-expanding rules force economic actors to find ways around them and because 
a weak and frequently corrupt state apparatus facilitates the systematic violation of these 
rules … In the end … as it happened in the defunct socialist states of Eastern Europe and is 
currently happening in Cuba, the “second economy” becomes the real economy of the 
country effectively displacing that subject to official planning.’47 
 
In Zimbabwe, the economic policies that the government adopted not only deepened 
poverty but also made the cost of conducting business in the formal sector prohibitively 
costly. For instance, the mismanaged exchange rate and high inflation rate made earnings 
and savings of Zimbabweans worthless. The government ignored the implications of this 
                                                             
44 Gilpin, R., ‘Depoliticizing Zimbabwe’s Economy: Solutions for Two Million Percent,’ in United States Institute 
of Peace, Washington D.C, Aug 2008, p. 3. 
45 Sookram, S and Watson, P. K., Op.cit, p. 5. 
46 Centeno, M.A and Portes, A., ‘The Informal Economy in the Shadow of the State,’ in Princeton University, 
New Jersey, Feb 2003, p. 7. 
47 Ibid. p. 9 and 12. 
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policy which included foreign currency shortages and increasing parallel market premium 
which it sought to mitigate through price controls and introducing limits on daily bank 
withdrawals implications for employment, food security and economic growth in the 
country.48 Therefore, the state can be seen as the prime cause of stagnation of the informal 
sector because of its regulations and administrative practices.49 Specifically, ‘the lack of 
coordination and assistance from government and other stakeholders is hindering small 
entrepreneurs from attaining their full potential.’50 Thus it can be said that governments 
policies directly impact on this sector and can either be detrimental or beneficial. As key 
policy and decision makers it is important for government to understand not only the 
importance of this sector, but also as government debates on which policies to adopt in the 
reconstruction process, the impact its policies will have on this sector. 
 
Becker argues that ‘appropriate policy frameworks and strategies aimed at the informal 
economy must be developed without hampering the potential of the informal economy for 
job creation and economic growth. The main challenge is thus to develop innovative and 
supportive policies that recognise the contributions of the informal economy and its 
workforce.’51 It is important to engage a sector that has played a fundamental role in the 
country’s economic activity. The vibrancy and resilience of this sector make it important for 
the government to integrate it into debates and programmes on the reconstruction process. 
McClain et al note that ‘the informal economy provides a number of critical and social 
benefits ... Many of these benefits accrue simultaneously, and all play a role in buttressing 
the working of the formal economy. These include cost cutting (a number of firms operating 
in the FS can cut costs by outsourcing to IS operators creating employment), training (the IS 
is a place where people can acquire the necessary skills, connections, and capital needed to 
eventually engage in regulated economic activities), and economic buffering (it acts as a 
                                                             
48 Gilpin, R., Op.cit, p. 2. 
49 Morrison, C, Lecomte, H and Oudin, X., ‘Micro-enterprises and the Institutional Framework,’ in Development 
Centre for OECD, Paris 1994, p. 13. 
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2002, p. 1. 
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safety net for those unable to participate in the FS). For some people it is their only option 
for earning income) to mention a few.’52 
 
Hence, the informal sector is not necessarily an undesirable sector. In Zimbabwe, an 
important aspect of the informal economy is the rise of cross border trade53 which has 
played a positive role in moderating economic hardships, reducing poverty and enhancing 
welfare and human development in the country.54 The informal economy becomes crucial 
‘to promoting growth and or reducing poverty (which is fundamental in achieving 
sustainable development).’55 The major contributions of this research to academic 
knowledge are: 
 Locating the informal sector in the current debates on the reconstruction process. 
 Linking the informal sector to the long term goal of sustainable development. 
With the formation of the unity government in February 2009, it is possible to conduct this 
research now because the government is committed to nation-wide reconstruction. In its 
efforts to do so, the new government and other actors like civil society organisations will 
have to address and formulate policies that deal with the informal sector. Previous research 
has extensively looked at the various elements of the informal sector in Zimbabwe, but it 
has not been within the context of the current reconstruction process. It is at this vital stage 
that makes this research both timely and relevant. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
52 McClain, R.J, Alexander, S.J and Jones, E.T., Op.cit, p. 12-3. 
53 ‘It can be argued that the informal sector through cross border trade has become by default an instrument 
driving regional economic integration, liberalisation of economic ties, trade and monetary harmonisation 
(Tekere, M, 2001, p. 20).’ 
54 Tekere, M., ‘Trade Liberalisation under Structural Economic Adjustment – Impact on Social Welfare in 
Zimbabwe,’ in Structural Adjustment Program Review Initiative (SAPRI), April 2001, p. 21. 
55 Chen, M., ‘Rethinking the Informal Economy,’ in http://www.un.org/../wp46_2007.pdf, Aug 2004 last visited 
08 May 2009, p. 3. 
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1.5 Theoretical Framework 
There are three main theories that inform the work on the informal sector. These theories 
have progressively been developed over the years. The first theory is the dualist model 
which argues that the informal sector is ‘marginal and peripheral and not linked to the 
formal sector or to modern capitalist development.’56 That is, this theory argues that the 
informal sector is a buffer and acts as a safety net in times of crisis. It absorbs the unlimited 
supply of labour that has been unable to enter into formal employment. Once modern 
industrial development is attained, this sector will disappear.  The second theory is the 
structuralist model that states that there is a close connection or link between the formal-
informal sectors.57 Theorists of this school of thought argue that the formal sector utilises 
cheap labour and inputs from the informal sector in their production processes.58 Therefore, 
the two are inextricably linked and should not be seen as separate or distinct. 
Informalisation is a normal process that occurs in capitalist development. 
 
The last theory is the legalist model which argues that government rules and regulations are 
responsible for stifling private enterprises and force small to medium entrepreneurs to opt 
to operate informally in order to avoid the costs of formal regulation.59 These theories 
encompass the larger debates on the informal economy. That is, debates such as the 
informal economy as a hindrance to development, and over-regulation that prevents this 
sector from achieving its full potential. In addition, the informal sector as an engine for 
growth and development, and linking the informal sector and the formal sector to mention 
a few. 
 
However, I believe the theory that best informs my research is the legalist school of 
thought. This is because, as a crucial decision and policy maker, it is important for 
government to realise the impact their policies have on the informal sector. As Zimbabwe is 
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57 Blunch, N, Canagarajah, S and Raju, D., Op.cit, p. 18. 
58 Chen, M., Op.cit, p. 6. 
59 Loc cit. 
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currently engaged in nation-wide reconstruction, it is important for the government to 
establish policies that are comprehensive, all inclusive and realise the potential this sector 
possesses. I will draw on certain aspects of the dualist and structuralist models especially 
those that propose that the informal sector can contribute positively to the growth and 
development of a country. 
 
1.6 Methodology 
This research has used qualitative research methods. It will mostly rely on secondary data 
from books, journals, official reports like the Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme 
(STERP), budget speeches, government responses, the UNDP Comprehensive Economic 
Recovery discussion document (from the Government of Zimbabwe and international 
institutions like the World Bank, International Labour Organisation, United Nations to 
mention a few), newspaper articles on current debates on the reconstruction process in 
Zimbabwe (from Zimbabwe, South Africa and internationally acclaimed news sites like CNN 
and BBC), and conference paper presentations on the informal sector by various scholars to 
mention a few. This research draws from the work that other scholars and organisations 
have done in an attempt to fill in the gaps and contribute to academic knowledge. 
 
In addition, this research has used statistical data issued by the Government of Zimbabwe, 
the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, independent researchers and scholars, and other sources 
like the IMF, WB and ILO. It will use material or information that looks at the broader 
debates on the informal sector, thereby allowing me to contextualise my research within 
the wider body of knowledge on the informal sector. Furthermore, this research will utilise 
material that discusses various theories of the informal sector, the informal sector in 
Zimbabwe, that is, its size, the various sectors/sections classified within this sector, how it 
operates, the government’s policies with regards to the informal sector, current debates on 
the reconstruction process and material that makes the link between the informal sector 
and sustainable development. 
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This information can be found in the University of the Witwatersrand libraries (in the form 
of books, journal articles, PHD and MA thesis on the informal sector, electronic resources 
like the ewits catalogue), the internet, specifically online journals, reports, presented 
documents and papers, newspaper articles, the United Nations Development Program, the 
Ministry of Economic Planning and investment, the Ministry of Local Government, and the 
Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprises and Cooperative Development in the Republic of 
Zimbabwe. 
 
1.7 Chapterisation 
 Chapter 1: Introduction  
The Theoretical and Analytical Framework 
 Chapter 2:  The Informal Sector in Zimbabwe: A Historical Overview 
 Chapter 3:  The Informal Sector as an Engine of Growth and Development 
 Chapter 4: The Informal Sector and the Current Reconstruction Process  
 Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
1.8 Literature Review 
In the 1950s and 1960s the informal sector was ‘frequently associated with poverty, 
underemployment and unemployment.’60 Thus, ‘it was widely assumed that with the right 
mix of economic policies and resources, poor traditional economies could be transformed 
into dynamic modern economies,’61 The IS was perceived as a sector that would fade away 
once countries began industrialising. Consequently, it became ‘difficult to persuade 
governments to recognise the validity of a concept or the phenomenon it described which 
represented the very image of their ability to change things.’62 However, in the early 1970s, 
there was a rethinking and a re-conceptualisation of this concept. That is, ‘the informal 
                                                             
60 Charmes, J., ‘A Critical Review of Concepts: Definitions and Studies in the Informal Sector,’ in Turnham, D, 
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61 Chen, M., Op.cit, p. 2. 
62 Charmes, J., Op.cit, p. 10. 
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sector has since been greeted as a promising concept …’63 therefore, the issue was not one 
of reducing the size of the sector, ‘but rather of promoting and expanding the growth 
generated in this sector.’64 It is within this context, that debates on the informal sector have 
been currently taking place. That is, various scholars agree on the importance, permanence 
and usefulness of this sector, but disagree on what role the informal economy plays and 
should play in the overall economy. There are three dominant schools of thought on the 
informal sector with which the vast literature on this sector can be classified under. These 
are namely the dualist, structuralist and legalist paradigms, which we will now look at. 
 
1.8.1 The Dualist School 
This school of thought was popularised by the International labour Organisation (ILO) in the 
1970s. It ‘subscribes to the notion that the informal sector is comprised of marginal 
activities – that provide income for the poor and a safety net in times of crisis … persistence 
of informal activities is due largely to the fact that not enough modern job opportunities 
have been created to absorb surplus labour.’65 This school of thought proposes that, once 
sufficient levels of economic growth are attained, the informal sector will gradually reduce 
in size.66 Therefore, in times of economic transition or adjustment, it acts as a buffer. 
According to Gerry, even the reformists believed that ‘the sector composed of ubiquitous 
Third World handicraft workers, petty traders, and peasants would act as a buffer to the 
worst traumas of underdevelopment. This would be the case at least until takeoff was 
achieved.’67 This can be regarded as one of the schools major contributions to academic 
knowledge. That is, most scholars do acknowledge that this sector ‘sometimes acts as a 
buffer for cyclical trends in the formal sector by providing a dumping ground for retrenched 
labour and waiting station for job seekers.’68 
 
                                                             
63 Breman, J., ‘A Dualistic Labour System: A Critique of the Informal Sector Concept,’ in Economic and Political 
Weekly, Vol. 11, No. 48, Nov 1976, p. 1879. 
64 Charmes, J., Op.cit, p. 10. 
65 Chen, M., Op.cit, p. 6. 
66 Chen, M., Op.cit, p. 2. 
67 Gerry, C., ‘Developing Economies and the Informal Sector in a Historical Perspective,’ in Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, Vol. 493, Sept 1987, p. 108. 
68 Kumbawa, D., Op.cit, p. 2. 
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However, many disagree that this sector is comprised of marginal activities. Scholars now 
realise the importance of these “marginal” activities in fuelling and instigating economic 
development.69 Blunch et al state that in many developing countries, ‘it is the primary 
source of employment for workers … accounting for 60%-80% of total non-agricultural 
employment,’70 Chen argues that within the dualist school of thought, the overarching goal 
is ‘to simplify institutional mechanisms governing the informal sector and integrate them as 
far as possible with those dealing with the formal economy [that is] promoting a dual policy 
focus that recognises and supports both informal enterprises/own account workers and 
informal jobs/paid workers.’71 
 
For instance, in Kenya, the government began to incorporate the informal economy into 
national economic policy as early as 1986. By 1992, the government had identified the IS as 
having the greatest potential for employment creation in the country.72 Additionally, ‘the 
Chinese government has taken increasing interest in the informal economy as a means to 
address the issue of unemployment. The Shanghai Municipal Government initiated a 
scheme of “informal labour organisations” [which] have become a sub-category of the 
informal economy … they become an inter-mediary or bridge category between the formal 
and informal economy.’73 Therefore, my research intends to emphasize the importance of 
this sector not just as a buffer or bridge, but as one of the elements that can fuel economic 
growth and development in the Zimbabwe. 
 
1.8.2 The Structuralist School 
This school of thought was popularised by Alejandro Portes (among others) in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. This theory states that ‘the informal sector should be seen as subordinated 
economic units (micro-firms) and workers that serve to reduce input and labour costs and, 
                                                             
69 Gerry, C., Op.cit, p. 109. 
70 Blunch, N, Canagarajah, S and Raju, D., Op.cit, p. 9. 
71 Chen, M., Op.cit, p. 10. 
 
72 Becker, K.F., Op.cit, p. 29. 
73 Ibid. p. 30. 
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thereby, increase the competitiveness of large capitalist firms … in marked contrast to the 
dualist model, different modes and forms of production are seen not to co-exist but also to 
be inextricably connected and interdependent.’74 According to this school of thought, ‘the 
nature of capitalist development (rather than a lack of growth) accounts for the persistence 
and growth of informal production relationships.’75 That is, the informal economy is linked 
to, and dominated by the formal sector in capitalist development. The IS, for instance, relies 
on the formal sector for its demand and supply of inputs, but in a manner that leaves very 
little room for its dynamic expansion.76 
 
Structuralists argue that, both informal enterprises and informal wage workers are 
subordinated to the interests of capitalist development, providing cheap goods and 
services.77 Thus, the nature of capitalist development results in an inextricable link between 
the informal and formal sectors. This can be regarded as one of the major contributions of 
this model. Many scholars had looked at these two sectors separately; not realising or 
acknowledging the interdependence and often times blur that exists between these two 
sectors. Chen states that, the IS does not exit separately from the FS. The IS trades with, 
produces for, distributes for and provides services to the formal sector.78 Once policy 
makers ‘acknowledge the existence and importance of these linkages … the next natural 
step [will be to] address and utilise the FS-IS linkages in policy.’79 According to Breman, ‘to 
replace the present hypothetical distinction between formal and informal sectors [a] strong 
linkage [should be made] intended to bring about harmonious cooperation on the basis of 
mutual advantage.’80 
 
Chen also mentions that, ‘given that the informal economy is here to stay and that the 
informal and formal economies are intrinsically linked, what is needed is an appropriate 
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policy response that promotes more equitable linkages between the informal and formal 
economies.’81 However, Heintz and Pollin argue that the process of in-formalisation should 
be reversed and that the informal economy should be formalised,82 but ‘policies which have 
sought to formalise the IS have failed because they did not recognise the fact that in-
formalisation is part of an economic process.’83 Therefore, in assessing government’s 
policies towards the IS, this research seeks to critically analyse the feasibility of formalising 
the informal sector. In some instances, the formalisation of the informal economy reduces 
the need for poverty combating programmes such as subsidized health care, large 
unemployment benefits etc.84 
 
1.8.3 The Legalist School 
This school of thought was popularised by Hernando de Soto in the 1980s and 1990s. This 
model states that, ‘the informal sector is comprised of micro-entrepreneurs who choose to 
operate informally in order to avoid the costs, time and effort of formal registration … 
micro-entrepreneurs will continue to produce informally so long as government rules and 
regulations are cumbersome and costly. In this view, unreasonable government rules and 
regulations are stifling private enterprise.’85 McClain et al state that, ‘nation-states generally 
take three approaches to dealing with informal activity that takes place in economic 
domains nominally subject to regulation: ignoring its existence, making an effort to control 
it, or legalising it. Most countries with weak state enforcement systems including Latin 
America and Southern European countries, tacitly permit businesses to operate informally 
…The disadvantage of ignoring informal economy activity is that … states provide incentives 
for the persistence of social inequities and unsafe working conditions.’86 They further state 
that, ‘states with relatively strong enforcement seek to control elements of informal activity 
by developing much stricter and more broadly reaching regulations or more effective 
monitoring and enforcement systems, a process referred to as criminalisation. However, 
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criminalisation efforts are often counterproductive. For example, if taxes and regulations 
are too onerous, attempts to enforce them merely drive businesses further underground or 
out of business (as was the case with Operation Restore Order which will be discussed in the 
next chapter).’87 
 
In other words, this school of thought focuses on government policies because they are 
believed to have a direct impact on the growth and expansion of the informal sector. 
Sookram and Watson state that, ‘governments and other state agencies may view informal 
business activity unfavourably if only because, prima facie, it deprives the state of revenue 
(tax evasion).’88 This has been the major contribution of this model to academic knowledge. 
Heintz and Pollin mention that, ‘most current theories of in-formalisation incorporate a role 
for Government regulations and formal institutional structures as they impose costs and 
constraints on economic actors.’89 Chen also states that, ‘in the past, the management or 
regulation of informal activities has often been relegated to social policy departments or, in 
urban areas, to those departments (such as the police or traffic) that deal with law and 
order issues. Locating governance of the informal economy in traffic, health, policy or social 
departments ignores its economic aspects. Institutions that govern the informal economy 
should be those dealing with economic planning and development.’90 
 
By stressing the importance of government to re-dress its rules and regulations, locating it 
within the appropriate government departments and to seek new comprehensive 
approaches that target economic planning and development, this sector can be allowed to 
flourish and contribute to overall economic growth.91 That is, ‘the state should therefore be 
very careful how it treats informal business activity and should at the very least consider its 
potential for a positive contribution. The government first has to determine the direction it 
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is going to take with regard to the informal sector and then determine which aspects of 
informal activity will be kept in check and which aspects are to be further developed and 
formalised.’92 In short, ‘governments should focus on developing meaningful risk 
management strategies which can enable the IS to realise its potential. Many governments 
today are beginning to realise the importance of such an approach but have a long way to 
go in terms of developing appropriate policy responses of the IS.’93 
 
One of the shortcomings of this theory is that in as much as it acknowledges that 
governments have a long way to go in developing appropriate responses for the informal 
sector, it does not propose how exactly governments should go about this and what 
sections of the informal sector they should particularly focus on. Therefore, in discussing 
how government can harness and partner with this sector to bring about sustainable 
development, this research seeks to address this. The next chapter will provide a historical 
overview of the informal sector in Zimbabwe, particularly how it has emerged to where we 
see it today. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE INFORMAL SECTOR IN ZIMBABWE – A 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In the mid 1950s, Sir Arthur Lewis developed a theoretical model of economic development. 
This model was based on the assumptions that there was an unlimited supply of labour in 
most of the developing countries. That is, as countries began to industrialise and modernise, 
Lewis assumed that this pool of labour would be absorbed by the modern industrial sector 
and the traditional sector comprised of petty traders, small producers and a range of causal 
jobs would eventually be absorbed into the formal economy and disappear.94 However, the 
first ILO employment mission to Africa (Kenya) in 1972 observed that the IS had not just 
persisted but also expanded. Economic development in developing countries had failed to 
create enough urban jobs to absorb the increasing number of unemployed people or surplus 
labour.95 
 
Thus, the informal sector (defined by the ILO and UNDP 1972 as the non-structured sector 
that has emerged in the urban centres as a result of the incapacity of the modern sector to 
absorb new entrants)96 is not a feature unique to Zimbabwe, but is common in most 
developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. It also exists in developed 
economies97 but is not as prevalent. Breman states that, ‘for the third world it amounts to 
roughly 25%.’98 For example, in Zambia in 1996 it was reported that ‘the informal sector was 
growing faster than the formal sector and some formal sector shop owners were now selling 
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their goods to the large informal sector operators in order to evade paying tax. In Malawi, 
the informal sector began to flourish in 1991 after the introduction of a multi-party system 
and the reform programme and since then many streets in Blantyre have been taken over 
by informal sector traders.’99 
 
Mupedziswa and Gumbo further state that, ‘the Zimbabwean experience has not been very 
different from that of its other counterparts in the sub-region. As noted by the Herald 
(1996): The hue and cry and a feeling of hopelessness that accompanied the launch of the 
harsh economic reform program five years ago (1991) is dissipating among Zimbabweans. A 
new work ethic, marked by the proliferation of backyard industries is now taking shape. The 
informal sector, once derided as an exclusive presence for an uneducated and unskilled 
individual with no prospects of growing a job in the formal sector, has become a life line for 
a growing number of Zimbabweans, from retrenched professionals and highly skilled 
workers to retirees and others entering the job for the first time.’100 The proliferation of 
backyard industries and various informal sector activities have remained a key component 
of the country’s economic activity. 
 
Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to trace the history and role of the IS in Zimbabwe from 
independence in 1980 to 2009. To understand the development of this sector, it is 
important to understand events occurring within the broader economic and political 
spheres. Luebker states that, ‘the development of the informal economy cannot be seen in 
isolation from a country’s overall economic performance. In particular, the generation of 
jobs in the formal sector is often a crucial determinant of the size of the informal sector 
since the latter frequently absorbs those who cannot find employment in the formal sector 
…’101 This chapter will show that over the years the size of this sector has grown to epic 
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proportions and constitutes an important part of the country’s macro-economic 
environment. This chapter will also reflect on the Government of Zimbabwe’s (GOZs) 
attitudes towards this sector which have ranged from lack of recognition, support to 
contempt. 
 
2.2 Hope after a Legacy of Colonialism: 1980-1990 
According to Chiripanhura and Makwavarara, ‘the problems of unemployment and 
underemployment are evident in most African economies. The structure of the economies is 
fundamentally entrenched in dualism and enclavity. At independence in 1980, Zimbabwe 
inherited an economy that exhibited both extreme characteristics of a relatively developed 
economy and economic backwardness … This dualism (separate development) had arisen 
from the policy of white supremacy that underlined the colonial era102. The relative strength 
of the economy lay in its diversified formal sector, with no overwhelmingly dominant 
sector.’103 They further state that despite the relatively developed nature of the economy 
that the government inherited in 1980, ‘the Zimbabwean economy [had] a dark side to it: 
the underdeveloped, deprived and marginalised non-formal sector which constituted about 
four fifths of the populations.104 
 
This separate development was as a result of the legacy of colonialism the country had just 
freed itself from which was characterised by unequal distribution of resources according to 
racial lines. ‘Given the highly inequitable distribution of resources and oppression during the 
colonial era, the post-independence government intervened extensively in the labour 
market to correct these distortions [that is] government intervention was aimed at uplifting 
the standard of living of ordinary Zimbabweans, to ensure security of employment … The 
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focus of government policy was outlined in its first policy of 1981, aptly entitled: “Growth 
with Equity (GWE)”.105 The main objectives and targets of GWE were to: ‘achieve a 
sustained high economic growth rate, restructure the economy in such a way that would 
promote investments and exports, reform the fiscal and monetary policies in order to 
stabilise prices as well as balance of payments and, also create and maintain high levels of 
employment for Zimbabweans in all sectors and levels of skill and responsibility.’106 This 
policy saw the government employing a large number of the labour force in the public 
sector. Total employment in the public sector increased from 9.3% in 1975 to 19% in 1985. 
The new government assumed the role of “employer of last resort.”107 
 
The GWE policy also resulted in the new government expanding its provision of social 
services which included health and education. Therefore, in the first decade of 
independence ‘employment grew annually by 1.8% or 1% during the 1980-1984 phase, and 
2.4% in the six years that followed. [As was mentioned earlier] this period was marked by 
high public sector employment growth. This high post-independence public sector 
employment growth is not unique to Zimbabwe. This has happened elsewhere in Africa … 
the government of Kenya, for example, acted as “employer of last resort” after 
independence. The motivation in Kenya was political and also to strike some ethnic 
balance.’108 During this first decade of independence, one could state that the GOZ was 
relatively able to absorb the “unlimited supply of labour”. The government put in place 
mechanisms to re-dress the unequally structured labour market which had existed during 
the colonial era. 
 
Chirisa states that from 1980 – 1990, ‘the formal sector was booming immensely such that 
the informal sector had very little role to play, especially in the urban centres. Yet it must be 
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admitted that there were many traces of it.’109 He further states that, ‘at the country’s 
independence in 1980, home industries had increased in number … It must also be 
underscored that the government policy to promote the idea of growth points in the 
countryside was move towards encouraging micro-entrepreneurialism. It was hoped that 
the new entrepreneurs would be established at the same time taking the small established 
small entrepreneurs to greater heights of investment.’110 Thus, within this decade it can be 
said that government supported the IS in the form of home-based industries and growth 
points, but due to large public sector employment, the informal sector during this decade 
was very small in size.  In addition, government did not seem to pay much attention to the IS 
during this time as it was absorbed with re-dressing past injustices and restructuring 
economic, political, social and cultural structures. 
 
However, despite widespread reforms, in the late 1980s GDP declined from 4.1% to 3.9%. 
This meant that ‘there was less economic growth, less investment to create more 
employment opportunities while at the same time, inflation increased from 9.2% to 12.2%. 
The end result was that employment became output constrained.’111 The final outcome of 
governments policies were that even though public sector employment had been relatively 
high, it was not sustainable. By 1989, the rate of unemployment was approximately 26% 
from about 12.5% in the mid 1980s.112 Contrary to Chirisa’s earlier argument that 
government promoted micro-entrepreneurs or informal sector initiatives, Chiripanhura and 
Makwavarara argue that, ‘the policies that were in place during that era (1980-1990) did not 
promote the informal sector, which under normal circumstances would mop-up most of the 
unemployed people into starting self help projects.’113 
 
Ncube compounds this argument by stating that, ‘when the prospects of employment 
creation in the formal sector were good, government’s attitude towards the informal sector 
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was hostile, with stiff and oppressive regulations. The central and local authorities hoped 
that this sector would one day disappear. However, the downturn in formal employment 
growth, high levels of rural-urban migration, and public and private sector retrenchments 
under structural adjustment led to a change in attitude.’114 Therefore, ‘by the end of the 
first decade of independence … the country was treading on a precarious road of recession. 
This saw the rationale for adopting the economic reform programme, which was in the form 
of [Economic] Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP)’ which was synonymous with the 
rapid growth of the informal sector.115 By the end of the first decade, the hope after a 
legacy of colonialism was grim and marked with scepticism. The informal sector which had 
been a rare feature during this decade was beginning to grow rapidly and become a 
prevalent feature of the macro-economic environment. 
 
2.3 The Decade of Economic Reform/Trade Liberalisation: 1991-2000 
According to Tekere, ‘trade liberalisation is one of the key elements of economic structural 
adjustment packages sold to developing countries by the Bretton Woods institutions, the 
WTO, bilateral and multilateral donors. It lies at the heart of the “New Washington 
Consensus” and has long been championed as the panacea to slow economic growth being 
experienced in developing countries … Neo-liberal economic reasoning justifies 
liberalisation of trade on the premise that it creates opportunities for firms to grow through 
better access to new production technologies, inputs, managerial and administrative skills 
and market information to local producers.’116 In addition, trade liberalisation is believed to 
enhance the welfare of consumers and reduces poverty since consumers will have 
opportunities to choose over a wide variety of better quality and cheaper imports. In other 
words, trade liberalisation is seen as a means towards enhancing social welfare, human 
development and sustainable economic growth and development.’117 Therefore, with 
support from the WB and the IMF, the government released a policy document entitled 
“Framework for Economic Reform” for the period 1991-1995. 
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Due to the rigidities posed by government’s interventionist policies in the first decade of 
independence, policy makers began to realise that in the early 1990s the economy was 
slowly becoming stagnant. A general economic crisis was looming and left with no 
alternatives in 1991 ‘the Government subsequently launched a fully fledged IMF and WB 
monitored program of ESAP which aimed to deregulate the domestic economy (prices, 
employment, and wages), reduce the public deficit, and continue relaxing restrictions on 
trade. As in other countries ESAP in Zimbabwe signalled a formal shift away from state 
interventionism and regulation toward non-interventionism, privatisation and 
deregulation.’118 ESAP occurred in four distinct phases. The first phase (August 1991-1993) 
started with the devaluation of the Zimbabwe dollar followed by continued depreciation of 
the currency. The second phase which began in 1993 saw the removal of export incentives 
except strategic commodities like fuel. 
 
The third phase which began in 1995 saw the government significantly reducing tariffs. 
During the third phase, foreign exchange was liberalised which led to currency 
convertibility. The last phase saw the implementation of Export Processing Zones (EPZs) 
which was meant to promote export oriented production.’119 However, ESAP failed and the 
result was widespread retrenchments (due to the belief that if government reduced the 
public sector, the private sector would absorb the retrenches’). Chirisa states that, ‘an 
uncompromising situation surfaced where thousands commissioned into unemployment 
had to search for a living and had no option but to be self employed. Urban poverty became 
a phenomenal reality as evidenced by the mushrooming of the informal sector operations in 
the country’s urban sphere.’120 Unemployment levels are said to have doubled from about 
10% in the 1980s to approximately 20% after 1990. That is, ‘rising unemployment during the 
period was [also] triggered partly by drought related reductions in domestic demand and 
production which in turn slowed formal sector job creation … A specific survey of the 
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informal sector indicated that lower paying and less secure informal sector jobs increased as 
formal sector employment slowed during the early 1990s.’121 
 
It is important to note that, ‘unlike many other nations, structural adjustment in Zimbabwe 
was not instituted in response to an acute “crisis situation” but rather as an effort to jump-
start economic growth. For Zimbabwe, economic crisis ironically followed rather than 
preceded ESAP …’122 in an attempt to protect its citizens from the effects of ESAP like 
retrenchment, poverty etc, the Government implemented the Social Development of 
Adjustment Programme (SDA). The SDA ‘provided for poverty monitoring effects but its 
centrepiece was a direct transfer programme, the Social Development Fund (SDF) … and had 
three components: direct transfers to cover food purchases for households with monthly 
incomes under a certain level, direct transfers to support health and school fee payment for 
these same households, and employment and training programs to retrain laid off 
workers.’123 
 
During the economic reform era, government attitudes towards the IS were beginning to 
change. Ncube states that, ‘realising the immense employment “sponge” effect of this 
sector, the public sector relaxed the laws regulating the sector. Because of the changes in 
the legal environment affecting the sector and retrenchments due to adjustment, there 
[was] a phenomenal increase in its size. Daniels estimates the growth of the non-formal 
sector at 14% between 1991 and 1993. As elsewhere in Africa, it [had] overtaken the formal 
sector in employment absorption (even in recent years).’124 In addition, it can be argued 
that government began to support the informal sector because of the failure of the SDA. In 
1993, the job training component of the SDF created approximately 2 000 jobs which was ‘a 
paltry sum in a country with an active labour force of 5 million and an unemployment rate 
estimated at over 25%.’125 
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Thus, by 1995 the government was forced to acknowledge the existence and potential of 
the informal sector. As in many other African states, this sector was increasingly becoming a 
‘key mechanism for coping with growing poverty, particularly in urban areas, as a result of 
the introduction of economic reform programmes.’126 A Sunday Mail article (1997) states 
that, ‘while before 1991 the informal sector was seen as an inferior and unorganised, the 
consequences of the reform programme, that is, economic hardships faced by many have 
transformed it into a vibrant and organised sector which is slowly overtaking industrial and 
commercial sectors as the leading employer. By 1996, the sector employed 1.56 million 
people compared to 1.26 million in the formal sector. These figures could even be an 
underestimation of people in the sector as many of them are not included in public statistics 
because of their invisibility.’127 
 
By 1996 ESAP had failed to generate economic growth and create jobs in the private sector 
to absorb the surplus labour as it had promised. In 1993, 1995, 1996 and increasingly so in 
1997, public workers went on major public protests which were termed “IMF riots”.128 In 
1996, the GOZ introduced a second reform economic programme called Zimbabwe Program 
for Economic Transformation (ZIMPREST) which would cover the period from 1996 to year 
2000. Chiripanhura and Makwavarara state that, ‘economic policies covering the period 
1996 to 2000 aimed at building on the achievements of and addressing the shortcomings of 
the economic policies of the first five years of economic reforms … [A] lesson that was 
identified is that for comprehensive reforms to succeed, they should be embedded in the 
aspirations of the people and that reforms should empower people to participate in the 
economy.’129 
 
Thus, ‘the failure to create macroeconomic stability played a major part in holding back 
growth during this period. The incidence of high inflation resulting from excessive 
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government borrowing to finance the largely recurrent expenditure, delivered high interest 
rates, well in excess of 55% by the end of 2000. This constrained the productive and 
employment capacity of industry, resulting in economic contraction. Macroeconomic 
instability dampened manufacturing activity, and, following trade liberalisation, a number of 
firms (especially in the textiles and clothing sectors) were forced to close down.’130 By year 
2000, the GOZ realised that most of the provisions stipulated in the ESAP and ZIMPREST 
documents had not been implemented. Government went ahead and drafted an 18 month 
stabilisation programme termed Millennium Economic Recovery Programme (MERP). 
However, by 2000 the economy was on the brink of total collapse and MERP failed to take 
on full effect.  
 
Luebker states that, ‘with the economic crisis, formal sector employment started to decline: 
from a peak of 1 241 500 in 1998 it fell to 1 012 900 in 2002 (reflecting a net loss of 228 600 
formal sector jobs). This represents a compound annual growth rate of -5.0%.’131 The result 
was sharp increase in the growth of the informal sector. Mupedziswa and Gumbo note that, 
‘the education system … churns out about 300 000 young person’s a year. The formal job 
market can only absorb a tenth thus leaving the rest to seek their livelihood in the informal 
sector. Thus the informal sector has been an employment haven for the thousands of 
people who need to make a living, given the hardships experienced during the economic 
reform [era].’132 This era was characterised by a rise in informal sector activities as a means 
of survival due to the failings of ESAP, SDA, SDF, ZIMPREST and MERP which resulted in 
retrenchments in the public sector. This era was also one characterised by government’s 
support and acknowledgement of the sector as it acted as a buffer and safety net for the 
thousands who had lost their livelihoods. The next decade only saw Zimbabwe’s economic 
woes deepening and informal sector activity souring to new heights. 
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2.4 The Decade of Total Economic Collapse and “Restoring Order”: 2000-
2009 
In year 2000, ‘two critical events unfolded in Zimbabwe, which significantly impacted, in a 
negative sense, the lives of the vast majority of the country’s population. First was the 
launching of the controversial land reform programme, and second the violence that 
followed the presidential elections in that year. These two contested, bloody events 
resulted in the country being ostracised by the international community, a development 
which marked the beginning of a major economic meltdown.’133 By the beginning of the 
new millennium, the country was faced with serious political and economic challenges. The 
controversial land reform programme resulted in a ‘steep decline of commercial agriculture 
after 2000 [which] robbed industry and [the government] of its traditional source of 
domestic inputs while also contributing to the economy wide shrinkage.’134 Zimbabwe’s 
economic crisis occurred at a period where other African countries were beginning to 
achieve reasonable rates of growth. That is, ‘compared with a cumulative gain of over 40% 
of GDP elsewhere in Africa, Zimbabwe’s GDP between 1998 and 2006 declined by -37%.’135 
 
The result of the economic meltdown was deepening poverty and further rise in 
unemployment rates. A 2003 Poverty Assessment Study Survey (PASS II) ‘showed that 72% 
of the population was living below the Total Consumption Poverty Line (TCPL) compared to 
55% in 1995.’136 Additionally, ‘significant job losses have occurred with de-industrialisation, 
and real wages have declined … Collapsing incomes and increasing poverty has in turn, 
translated into low levels of effective demand for goods and services. This has contributed 
to a significant underutilisation of existing factory and shop capacities, as well as extensive 
environmental degradation, as people scavenge for firewood, water and other possible 
means of survival.’137 All these factors contributed to a significant rise in informal sector 
                                                             
133 Mupedziswa, R., ‘Africa’s Diaspora’s and the Struggle for Survival: The Life and Times of Undocumented 
Zimbabwe Nationals Based in the United Kingdom,’ in Columbus, F 2009 (ed): Illegal Immigration: Causes, 
Methods and Effects, Nova Science Publishers, New York, 2009, p. 1. 
134 United Nations Development Program (UNDP)., ‘Comprehensive Economic Recovery in Zimbabwe: A 
Discussion Document,’ in UNDP Zimbabwe, Harare, 2008, p. 10. 
135 Ibid. p. 10-1. 
136 Ibid. p. 17. 
137 Ibid. p. 18. 
43 | P a g e  
 
activities which various scholars have argued can aid in enhancing economic growth and aid 
in poverty reduction. 
 
However, instead of being supportive of the IS, growth and poverty reduction, the 
governments macro-economic policies which included the National Economic Revival Plan 
(April 2003), Macroeconomic Policy Framework (November 2004), National Economic 
Development Priority Programme (April 2006), Zimbabwe Economic Development Strategy 
to mention a few, have been regarded by various scholars as the main binding constraints. 
Governments policies and attitudes especially towards the IS which has played a crucial role 
in the last decade have become more hostile illustrated through the nationwide clean-up 
campaign (aimed at restoring order in the urban centres around the country) known as 
Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order (OM/RO)). We will now look at this event in a bit 
more detail as it illustrates the changes in governments attitudes towards the IS, underlines 
the functional role of this sector especially in the last decade, and highlights the importance 
of forming policies that will include this sector during nation-wide reconstruction. 
 
On 19 May 2005, ‘with little or no warning, a military style “clean-up” operation started in 
the Zimbabwe capital, Harare. It quickly developed into a deliberate nationwide campaign, 
destroying what government termed illegal vending sites, structures and other informal 
business premises and homes, literally displacing hundreds and thousands of people.’138 
Kamete states that, ‘the authorities at both local and national levels insisted that it was an 
urban “clean-up” campaign [to clear urban centres of filth but] the “filth” (being cleaned up) 
was closely associated with poor urban dwellers, their livelihoods and housing. That is, 
people became filth if they occupied or used urban spaces in violation of planning and 
property laws; activities became filth if they happened in undesignated areas; informal 
businesses and residential structures were filth if they did not have requisite planning and 
building permission … Before it was officially suspended towards the end of July OM/RO had 
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virtually wiped out the urban informal economy and housing.’139 The operation did not just 
target illegal housing but also informal sector activities which severely impacted on the 
livelihoods of many. With no more than 20% of the population being employed in the 
formal sector and approximately 80% making a living in informal sector activities thus being 
able to pay fees, buy food, pay rent to mention a few, the operation had a severe impact on 
millions of Zimbabweans.140 
 
In the past decade, it is estimated that between 3 and 4 million Zimbabweans survive via 
informal employment and their earnings support approximately another 5 million people. 
Also, during this period, most local municipalities derived most of their revenue from fees 
levied form informal sector activities.141 That is, between 2000 and 2008 the informal 
economy was regarded as the ‘unofficial backbone of the economy and in a nation with no 
free health, housing or education, to remove the informal sector is to reduce Zimbabwe’s 
poorest to a state of abject poverty.’142 Ncube and Philip ‘maintain that the informal sector 
is the lifeblood of the nation.’143 The GOZ insisted and maintained that it had carried out the 
operation for technical, legal and practical reasons and that it acted within the parameters 
set out by appropriate legislation. The governments reasons included, ‘the problems of 
disorderly and chaotic urbanisation [which constitutes] a threat to public health and safety 
… the threat to the physical environment and natural resources caused by inappropriate and 
unlawful urban settlements, industrialisation and agricultural practices … the problem of 
social and economic sabotage.’144 
                                                             
139 Kamete, A.Y., ‘In the Service of Tyranny: Debating the Role of Planning in Zimbabwe’s “Clean-up” 
Operation,’ in Urban Studies Journal, Vol. 46, No. 4, April 2009, p. 897-8. 
140 ‘The UN Special envoy has put the total figure of those who lost homes and businesses at 650 000 to 700 
000 people and a total of 2.4million people who were directly and indirectly affected by OM/RO’ (Chibisa, P 
and Sigauke, C, 2008, p. 40). 
 ‘In addition, the attendant problems are multiple: homelessness, starvation, exposure to cold weather and 
diseases, loss of assets, ware and stocks, loss of income, wanton arrests, transport woes, rising rentals as result 
if increased and urgent demand for accommodation and abject poverty’ (Shack/Slum Dwellers International, 
June 2005, p. 2).  
141 Tibaijuka, A., Op.cit, p. 17. 
142 Sokwanele., ‘Operation Murambatsvina: An Overview and Summary,’ in 
http://www.sokwanele.com/articles/sokwanele/opmuramb_overview_18june2005.html, 18 June 2005 last 
visited 11 May 2009, p. 1. 
143 Ncube and Philip (2006) in Chibisa, P and Sigauke, Op.cit, p. 38. 
144 Kamete, A.Y., Op.cit, p. 907. 
45 | P a g e  
 
 
On the point of economic and social sabotage, the government believed that the IS was 
ridden with criminal activity which robbed the government of revenue, foreign currency to 
mention a few. In August 2005, the Minister of Local Government and Urban Development, 
Dr Ignatius Chombo stated that, ‘the government insists that all the sweeps and demolitions 
have been to rid the country of the chaotic nature of an unregulated market and to clear up 
the blurred distinctions between informal and formal sectors of business. An economy 
cannot be run on an informal sector, but it is run by a formal sector with the informal sector 
offering a supporting role. The formal sector provides the bulk of the revenue that also 
trickles down to the informal sector, whilst the informal sector is levied according to its 
earnings, and in so doing also contributes to the economy. This relationship had become 
blurred and we are correcting it.’145 Central government also argued that the operation was 
carried out as an effort to put an end to crime and illegal dealings that were associated with 
the more unsavoury parts of the informal sector, such as, foreign currency dealings.146 
 
Speaking at a police parade in the capital city on 23 June 2005, President Robert Mugabe 
justified the operation as follows: ‘I applaud the police for supporting Operation 
Murambatsvina across the country that targeted illegal structures serving as notorious 
criminals hideouts and havens for black market activities … According to the President, 
people had abused the opening up of economic empowerment opportunities for the 
historically disadvantage black majority147 by engaging in profiteering, illegal deals, 
externalisation of foreign currency, fraud, corruption, hording of essential commodities and 
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tax evasion.’148 Indeed there are some aspects of the informal sector that were 
characterised by illegal and criminal activities. For example, ‘small scale gold mining [had 
and still is] become increasingly prominent with the growth of the informal economy in 
Zimbabwe … tens of thousands have been involved in panning and selling surprisingly large 
quantities of mainly alluvial gold’149 robbing the government of much needed revenue150. 
 
That is, ‘in economic terms, the losses caused by these illegalities are significant both for 
private investors and national fiscus. The government claimed that 50 000-60 000 carats are 
being produced per week, but the value ascribed to then has clearly been understated and it 
is plain that many more diamonds (as well as other minerals like gold and platinum) are 
being sold on the black market. ACR estimates that revenue of between US$ 50 and US$ 500 
million is being lost to government per annum.’151 However, while there is a criminal and 
illegal element to some of the IS activities, as was mentioned earlier, most of these activities 
involve ordinary people who are trying to eke out a living and meet their basic needs for the 
day. Slaughter states that, with a high unemployment rate ‘no social security, millions of 
people have no means of support. They have been forced into the informal or black 
economy in order to survive. Even people with regular employment are forced to dabble in 
the “black economy” to make ends meet.’152  
 
However, from an accommodative and even supportive attitude towards the IS in the 
1990s, in 2005 the government showed hostility and disregard for this sector. Chibisa and 
Sigauke state that, ‘in spite of recent policy shifts and advances in supporting the informal 
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sector, official attitudes in Zimbabwe have remained largely hostile; also in spite of 
mounting problems of unemployment and the inability of urban authorities to cope with the 
demand for social facilities. The role of the informal sector in Zimbabwe lacks consistent 
official recognition and support,’153 despite the fact that in the last decade (as many scholars 
would argue) this sector has saved the country from complete economic devastation. Thus, 
especially between 2000 and 2008, the informal sector in Zimbabwe has been an 
instrumental tool in ensuring that the basic needs of millions of Zimbabweans are provided 
for. It has come to constitute an important part of the country’s macroeconomic 
environment, acting as a buffer, a mechanism for poverty alleviation and job creation. 
 
2.5 Summary 
This chapter has provided a historical overview of the evolution of the informal sector in 
Zimbabwe over three distinct phases. In the first decade of the country’s independence, the 
informal sector existed but it was not vibrant. During this era, most of the labour force was 
absorbed in the public sector under the governments ‘Growth with Equity’ policy. However, 
by the late 1980s, the country’s economy was beginning to show signs of distress mainly 
because of government’s interventionist policies and protectionist measures. As a way to 
prevent economic collapse as well as to facilitate economic growth, the government 
introduced ESAP and ZIMPREST but these failed to deliver on their promises to create jobs 
and enhance economic growth. As a result, many lost their jobs in the formal sector and this 
period saw a significant rise in the informal sector. During this period, government began to 
recognise the importance of this sector and also supported it by instituting policies that 
allowed women for instance to sell goods in flea markets.  
 
However, it is especially during the 2000-2008 period that the informal sector grew to epic 
proportions. This is mainly due to the economic meltdown the country went through. In 
order to survive, citizens have been forced to engage in this sector. But rather than be 
supportive, governments attitudes towards this sector were increasingly hostile reflected 
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through the clean-up campaign carried out between May and July 2005. From supporting 
this sector, government totally shifted its approach and policies towards the IS resulting in 
the loss of livelihoods for millions of Zimbabweans. This sector has played a crucial role in 
the country especially in the last decade and constitutes an important part of the country’s 
macroeconomic environment. The next chapter will look at the informal sector as an engine 
of growth and development. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE INFORMAL SECTOR AS AN ENGINE OF 
GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
3.1 Introduction 
As was mentioned earlier, in the last decade of Zimbabwe’s independence, the social, 
political, and economic fabric of society has been very grim. In a research report by John 
Makumbe on the ‘Impact of Democracy in Zimbabwe’ he reiterated that in the period 
between 2000 and 2007 there was a sharp decline in the country’s economy resulting in a 
series of problems. Specifically, 80% of manufacturing firms in the country witnessed a 
decline in their output volumes, approximately 15% of them are operating at less than 30% 
of their normal productive capacities, another third are operating between 30% and 50% of 
their productive capacities, and more than 90% are unable to cover their costs, thus 
operating at a loss.154 
 
The picture is no better in the mining and agricultural sectors (all of which are major 
revenue earners for Government) which have seen a decline in production of nearly 50%. In 
the Mid-Term Fiscal Policy in July 2006, the Minister of Finance noted that the challenges 
facing the country included rising inflation, erratic fuel supplies, corruption, a decline in 
savings and investment, interruptions to electricity supply, inadequate foreign exchange 
affecting the country’s import capacity. In addition, annual inflation had escalated to a 
record high of 1193.5% by May 2006; there was a 31% decline in tourism receipts in the first 
quarter of 2006 largely due to leakages and the negative image of the country, there was a 
rise in public sector borrowing and considerable growth in money supply, current account 
                                                             
154 Makumbe, J., ‘The Impact of Democracy on Zimbabwe: Assessing political, social and economic 
developments since the dawn of democracy,’ in Centre for Policy Studies, Research Report 119, Johannesburg, 
Sept 2009, p. 3. 
50 | P a g e  
 
deficit was in excess of US$ 200 million, and the country had external debt amounting to 
US$ 3968 million.155 
Furthermore, the social sector in the country totally collapsed which greatly affected the 
education and health sectors as well as the living standards of majority of the population. In 
a survey conducted by Mass Public Opinion Institute (MPOI) between 2004 and 2005, the 
institute found that ‘majority of the respondents expressed deep concern about their 
personal living conditions, which 88% of them regarded their economic conditions as very 
bad …’156 Thus the economic environment and worsening political conditions have had a 
direct impact in the livelihoods of millions of Zimbabweans. Even amidst optimism 
surrounding the “debatable” formation of the GNU in early 2009, the impact of the 
economic meltdown still resonates with majority of the populace as they still struggle to 
make ends meet. Given the economic hardships faced by many and the functional role that 
the informal sector has played since the early 1990s, this sector can be utilised as an engine 
for growth and development. 
 
In 1990, Charmes found evidence that, ‘the informal sector worker generally contributes to 
GDP over and beyond the minimum wage. Furthermore, Charmes suggests that generally, 
productivity in this sector is much higher than average per capita GNP in the economy.’157 
Therefore, the informal sector within the larger macroeconomic environment is not wholly 
undesirable. During the era of total economic collapse in Zimbabwe, informal sector 
operations like cross border trade ensured that foreign currency, basic necessities, luxury 
goods among others remained within the reach of ordinary citizens. Government also 
earned some revenue via customs duties taxed on traders and from Zimbabweans in the 
Diaspora via remittances (that often flow through informal channels).  
 
That is, in the broader debates of informal sector activities and economic growth, 
perceptions of this sector have considerably shifted. Traditional or old views of this sector 
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were that it was marginally productive sector that will wither away and die once countries 
have modernised, it exists separately from the formal sector, and most activities in this 
sector are illegal and are a deliberate effort to avoid tedious government red tape and 
taxation.158 However, due to the prevalence and perpetual growth of this sector, scholars 
were forced to rethink the value, importance and contribution this sector can make to 
industrial development. The new views included perceptions like, the informal sector is a 
permanent feature that expands with industrial growth, it contributes a significant share of 
GDP, it is inherently linked to the formal sector, much of the rise in informal employment is 
as a result of a decline in formal employment or to the in-formalisation if previously formal 
employment relationships, and that the informal sector is a major provider of employment, 
goods and services especially for lower income groups.159 
 
However, ‘in recent years there has been a renewed interest in defining, measuring and 
studying the informal economy to comprehend its reach, impact and contributions to the 
economy and society in developing countries. Governments are also realising the need for 
pro-active measures to ensure that the informal economy becomes an engine of inclusive 
growth and development.’160 Therefore, this chapter seeks to explore the contribution the 
informal sector can make to economic growth and development in light of the fact that it 
constituted a very significant part of the country’s macroeconomic environment. There are 
various ways this sector can be utilised to facilitate growth and development but this 
chapter will look at the IS enhancing economic growth through job creation, informal 
remittance transfers, and poverty alleviation. We will now look at the Zimbabwe Diaspora, 
informal remittance transfers and economic growth in a bit more detail. 
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3.2 Informal Remittance Transfers, Economic Growth and Development 
According to Mupedziswa: 
estimates of Zimbabwe nationals that have left the country especially since 2000 do 
vary but the figures run into millions … Research carried out by Chetsanga and 
Muchenje (2003) revealed that by the year 2003, the number of Zimbabwean 
nationals who had legally left the country for the Diasporas (since 1990) was 
approximately 536 000. However, revised estimates made available a year later 
(2004), put the figure of Zimbabwean nationals (both documented and 
undocumented) living abroad at an estimated 3.4 million. Zimbabwean nationals in 
the Diasporas are broken down as follows: 1.2 million are in South Africa, 1.1 million 
are in the UK, 100 000 in Australia, 100 000 in Canada, 300 000 in Botswana, another 
200 000 in Mozambique, and the rest in other parts of the world.161 
Most of these individuals have left the countries for various reasons, such as, better 
opportunities, economic and political repression, and other social and cultural reasons. For 
most Diasporas, the trend is to remit money back home as some would have left their 
families. Remittances can be defined as the ‘act of transmitting money, bills or the like, 
especially to a distant place, as in satisfaction of demand or in discharge of obligation. 
Remittances are associated with the global phenomenon of migration, with individuals 
(mostly) from developing countries moving to developed countries often in large numbers, 
in search of greener pastures.’162  
 
Bracking and Sachikonye state that, ‘international migration can have a positive impact on 
poverty reduction through the generation of migrant remittances … and for the vast 
majority of researchers … remittances are positively associated with economic growth.’163 
That is, ‘during the 1980s, [remittances] financed 80% of the current account deficit in 
Botswana, over 50% of foreign exchange earnings in Lesotho, and 70% of total commodity 
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export earnings in Sudan. [Additionally] a full 50% of urban households in Harare and 
Bulawayo in Zimbabwe were dependent on migrant remittances for everyday 
consumables.’164 Mupedziswa states that, while remittances ‘constitute a very old 
phenomenon, appreciation of remittances as a development tool is a rather more recent 
phenomenon.’165  It is important to note, in most countries remittances flow official through 
channels, but in Zimbabwe this is rarely the case. ‘In 2003 to 2004, there was tremendous 
enthusiasm about the prospects of remittance flows from Zimbabweans in the Diaspora. 
The incoming Central Bank governor, Gideon Gono, appointed in 2003 was one of the most 
enthusiastic proponents of encouraging such flows citing the successful remittance flows 
into countries such as Ghana and India … This led to the launch of the Homelink Scheme as a 
vehicle through which flows would be sent into the country under the auspices of the 
Central Bank.’166 
 
However, ‘three years later (by 2007), the momentum for official campaign for remittances 
has almost disappeared … What has happened between 2004 and 2006 to dampen the 
earlier official euphoria for remittances? A likely explanation is that although remittances 
may not have diminished, they no longer flow through channels as the Central Bank and 
commercial banks.’167 Mupedziswa notes that, ‘the total amount transferred from South 
Africa to Zimbabwe each year is approximately R4.9 billion … It has been claimed that on 
average US$ 4 million flow into Zimbabwe per day, which would result in annual average of 
US$ 1.5 billion … Ideally, such an amount in foreign currency would certainly go a long way 
in alleviating the foreign currency shortage crippling Zimbabwe. However, as some analysts 
have correctly observed, this would only be possible if the monies were being transferred 
using official channels.’168 Thus, while this may contribute to the deterioration of the 
economy or the criminalisation of certain informal activities, remittances through informal 
channels have been crucial in ensuring the survival of most households and in alleviating 
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poverty. Remittances have come to play a very fundamental and critical role in the 
economies of various countries. 
 
In Zimbabwe, ‘remittances are critical to alleviating household poverty in urban Zimbabwe 
… Not only do a full 50 percent receive remittances, but it is clear that a substantial majority 
of these are dependent on the, for essential household goods, including food.’169 Brackings 
and Sachikonye state that, ‘it is clear [from their research] that a complex web of money 
and goods transactions within the informal sector supports the Zimbabwean economy in 
unrecorded myriad ways. The Zimbabwean economic collapse, which has been headlined 
for some time not, is being offset by this informal, internationalised parallel economy. In 
practical terms, it is difficult to see how some of these households could even survive 
without these informal remittance transfers.’170 Therefore, even the informal transfer of 
remittances can be used to contribute to economic growth. They have been crucial in 
alleviating poverty for most households in the country.  
 
In other words, ‘the informal economy is an important conduit for households in terms of 
their sending, [spending], and receipt of remittances … In sum, over 58% of households used 
only family members or family couriers to send and receive money, and about two thirds of 
[the] money is in-formalised.’171 Most of the money remitted to households in Zimbabwe is 
channelled back into the informal sector. This is mainly because of the shortage of and lack 
of goods or basic necessities in formal operations. Between 2000 and 2008, a significant 
amount of household products were found in the informal sector. Thus, remittances were 
not only sent through informal channels but were also used in the informal sector. In 2005, 
due to unavailable and inaccurate data on remittance flows to Zimbabwe, a house-hold 
level Migration and Remittances Survey (MARS) was implemented and surveyed 723 urban 
and rural households. 
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One of the findings of this study was that the most common use of remittances by 67% of 
households was to buy food and other basic necessities commonly found in the informal 
sector.172 Tevera and Chikanda state that, ‘a broad distinction is often drawn between 
productive and consumptive use of remittances. Since most remittances to Zimbabwe are 
aimed at easing the livelihood constraints of the households back home, consumption tends 
to dominate remittance usage.’173 Therefore, informal remittance transfers have not only 
contributed to economic growth and aided households in alleviating poverty, but one could 
argue that they have also facilitated the growth of informal sector operations. That is, 
money remitted is used to purchase goods in the informal sector which is used by IS 
operators to expand their operations or acquire more stock for re-sale within the informal 
sector. 
 
However, in order to maximise the potential of remittance transfers, reinstating trust in the 
banking system is important. Mupedziswa notes that, ‘if the right policies are implemented, 
these can promote remittance inflows by encouraging Zimbabwean nationals [around the 
world] to hold savings in financial assets in Zimbabwe rather than out of the country. This 
would help reduce the propensity on the part of migrants, to spend their savings on 
consumer goods, or better still, it would help by redirecting remittances into official 
channels, and facilitate investment in self-employment and enterprise creation inside 
Zimbabwe.’174 Hence, the contribution informal remittance transfers have made (and are 
still making) to Zimbabwe’s economy cannot be negated or ignored. Another way the IS can 
and has contributed to economic growth and development in the country is through job 
creation. 
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3.3 The Informal Sector: Creating Jobs 
The informal sector is widely viewed as being ‘counter cyclical, that is, contracting during 
economic booms and expanding during recessions. However, informal sector activities can 
[also] rise during times of economic boom …’175 which can be due to ‘jobless growth in 
organised manufacturing as well as services and the comparatively slow pace of long term 
structural change in the economy.’176 It is especially during times of economic distress that 
the informal sector acts a safety net for thousands who are retrenched. This was the case in 
Zimbabwe during the structural adjustment era and also during the economic meltdown. 
However, in the last 10 years, the informal sector has been observed to employ a greater 
number of people than the formal sector, due to companies shutting down or producing 
below their normal productive capacities. Thus, ‘the informal sector is often, by far, the 
most important source of employment in many developing economies as the formal sector 
– both private and public – has struggled to generate sufficient employment ... Its 
perpetuation and growth has been largely due to the weak capacity of the formal private 
sector to generate adequate employment and incomes, in many countries, in the face of 
high rates of labour force growth and rural-urban migration.’177  
 
By partnering with this sector, government can ensure that developmental objectives such 
as poverty alleviation, job and wealth creation are attained. Mupedziswa and Gumbo state 
that, ‘the importance of the informal sector cannot be overemphasized in terms of job 
creation.’178 This is also in light of the fact that the education system churns out thousands 
of school leavers annually. With the economic collapse, it has been difficult to absorb all 
school leavers, thus the informal sector has been an employment haven for many. Hence, 
‘the informal sector is crucial for developing countries as it contributes a substantial share of 
employment and output as well as provides livelihoods to millions …’179 Indeed this sector 
can be used an engine for growth and development. Gerry notes that, informal sector 
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activities ‘have indeed become legitimate objects of government and academic interest 
viewed as employment creating, enterprise generating, wealth creating, or even liberating 
and self emancipating options, located outside of large corporate, unionised manufacturing 
industry.’180 
 
The informal sector is characterised by the following, low resource base, small-scale, ease of 
entry, labour intensive, adapted technology, unregulated but competitive markets, informal 
processes of acquiring skills, family ownership, self employment and apprentices.181 These 
characteristics encourage entrepreneurship which has positive effects to the attainment of 
developmental objectives in the long run. That is, as small and micro-enterprises sharpen 
their skills, they are likely to expand, formalise and employ and train more people. This is 
especially useful in a country undergoing nationwide reconstruction. The informal sector 
can offer relevant skills (as this sector is very much demand driven, offering skills that are in 
demand and directly linked to the activities to be undertaken) and employment to those 
who are still suffering the impact of the economic collapse. 
 
Dasgupta notes that, ‘if the formal sector in DCs are unlikely to create new jobs without a 
much faster rate of growth, the burden of providing employment and work will fall 
necessarily on the informal sector. This points ‘to the important role which this sector will 
need to increasingly play in the low and middle income countries … The main issue is how to 
make this sector dynamic.’ With the support of Government and pro-IS policies, this sector 
can contribute to job creation. In short:  
The informal sector contributes significantly to production, consumption, and 
employment and income generation in developing countries. It is a source of 
livelihood to a majority of the poor, unskilled, socially marginalised and female 
population and is an important means of survival for people in countries lacking 
proper social and safety nets and unemployment insurance especially for those 
lacking skills for formal sector jobs. Apart from being a major source of employment, 
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the informal economy also contributes significantly to the output of developing 
countries182, thereby, playing a fundamental role in the growth and development of 
the overall economy. 
Another way this sector can contribute to overall growth and development is through 
poverty alleviation which is crucial in achieving sustainable development. 
 
3.4 The Informal Sector, Poverty Alleviation, and Development 
According to the International Labour Organisation (ILO), ‘eradicating poverty in sub-
Saharan Africa continues to be the largest challenge for the community today. During the 
last 25 years, the number of poor has doubled from 150 million to 300 million, half the 
population are surviving on US$ 1 a day or less.’183 In Zimbabwe, like in most sub-Saharan 
countries, poverty is a serious challenge facing the country in light of the political and 
economic mayhem and economic reforms in the past 20 years. In a paper by Jotham 
Dhemba on “Informal Sector Development,” he begins by asking ‘why should we be 
concerned about urban poverty alleviation in Zimbabwe? [He goes on to answer by stating 
that] some of the main reasons are, first, because of the declining living conditions of the 
urban poor. Decreased employment opportunities, the decline in real wages, rising food and 
fuel prices and acute housing shortages, are all manifestations of the falling socio-economic 
conditions of the urban poor.’184 He also goes on to state that rural to urban migration is 
another reason why scholars, governments and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) should be 
concerned with urban poverty as individuals move to cities in search of better opportunities, 
higher living standards and employment. This has led to a growing concentration of people 
in urban areas or cities. Lastly, he mentions that, ‘despite urban-biased development 
initiatives, as of now, there are no comprehensive poverty alleviation programmes focusing 
on the urban poor.’185 
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Thus, the informal sector can be developed and used as a poverty alleviation strategy 
especially in Zimbabwe where thousands have lost their jobs, homes and have been forced 
to engage with the informal sector in order to survive. However, ‘there are contradicting 
views regarding the relationship between poverty and the IS. On the one hand, the IS seems 
to trap its actors in poverty while on the other, it contributes to the reduction of poverty. 
[That is], the IS offers jobs that are of low quality, have poor employment and working 
conditions and therefore do not contribute much to poverty reduction. Among the working 
population, workers in the IS are poorly renumerated, underemployed, have no social 
protection … Thus, it can be inferred that poverty forces people to engage in the IS and 
working in the IS means poverty.’186 Contrary to this view that associates or links the 
informal sector with sustained poverty, Anderson (1998) in Kappel and Ishengoma 
‘attempted an answer to the question: how would the poverty situation have looked in the 
absence of the IS? He revealed that in 1996, around 38% of households in 
Ulaanbaatar/Mongolia had a poverty level income. In the absence of informal incomes, 53% 
of households would have fallen below the official poverty line, which attests to the 
contribution of IS poverty reduction.’187 
 
A similar picture can be painted in Zimbabwe which has an unemployment rate of between 
80% and 94%. In the absence of IS activities especially post-2000, majority of the population 
would have been living in abject poverty without any source of income or safety net to help 
them or their families. Developmental theorists agree with the notion of using the informal 
sector strategy in the fight against poverty. That is, ‘developmentalists reject the 
prescriptions of the modernisation theory188, and while there is recognition of the need for 
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economic growth, the uneven distribution of wealth that ensues is not acceptable. In order 
to reduce poverty developmentalists call for concerted state intervention and the adoption 
of specific poverty alleviation measures.’189 Dhemba states that, In Zimbabwe ‘as we 
reminisce on the poverty unleashed in the years of “structural adjustment without growth,” 
(and the more recent economic collapse) and embark on the second phase (and now third 
phase) of economic reforms, the pursuit of a developmentalists approach to development 
holds the greatest potential to poverty alleviation. In particular, the development of the 
informal sector promises to empower the poor and meet their basic needs … While there 
are dissenting voices on the role of the informal sector in poverty alleviation by those who 
feel that its importance is often exaggerated, this sector is set to grow. In view of increasing 
levels of urban poverty in Zimbabwe, it is important to seriously consider ways of promoting 
the informal sector.’190 
 
According to the report of the Commission for Africa cited in an International Labour 
Organisation article, ‘the continent needs successful African entrepreneurs and a strong and 
vibrant small enterprise sector to provide the innovation and productivity necessary for long 
term poverty reduction.’191 However, ‘the urban poor in Zimbabwe are … a forgotten lot in 
poverty alleviation programmes. Sadly, at this time when urban poverty is increasing at 
unprecedented levels, urban poverty should take the centre-stage in all development 
endeavours.’192 As the GNU strives to attain sustainable development, the informal sector 
can be used as a tool driving economic growth and development through reducing poverty 
(among other things) in the country. Ncube and Phillip note that ‘with formal 
unemployment standing at over 80% and with over 80% of the population below the 
poverty datum line, the informal sector was in 2005 estimated to contribute as much as 60% 
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It can therefore be considered as playing a crucial role in 
poverty alleviation.’193 
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The characteristics of informal sector enterprises make it relatively easier to transform this 
sector into an engine that can aid the new Government in reaching its developmental 
objectives. That is, informal sector enterprises have the flexibility to supply goods and 
services for low income groups at relatively affordable prices which most formal sector 
enterprises are unable to do.194 It is important to note that, ‘at independence, the potential 
role of the informal sector in job creation and poverty alleviation was also noticed by the 
Riddell Commission (1981) which recommended that the new Zimbabwe needed to 
recognise and promote this sector in order to raise the standard of living of the majority of 
the people. It was evident that urban poverty was on the increase and the formal sector 
would not be able to provide jobs to all.’195 Therefore, even at independence prior to the 
era of economic reforms and the economic meltdown, it was recommended to the new 
Government to put in place policies and strategies that would promote and harness the 
potential of this sector. 
 
With the current state of affairs in the country and as the government tries to pick up the 
shattered economy, as was recommended by the Riddell Commission, this sector can 
perform a functional role not only in enhancing economic growth or job creation, but by 
also helping to attain a sustainable level of development. However, while the IS possesses 
the potential to be a poverty alleviation mechanism, its growth is often constrained by 
various problems. The major constraints196 mainly include legal and regulatory impediments 
as was mentioned earlier and difficulties in accessing capital. Dhemba states that, ‘the most 
serious problems are lack of capital and restrictive by-laws and legislation. Mupedziswa’s 
(1991) study found that operations of 41% of the respondents had been negatively affected 
by lack of capital. This is mainly because financial institutions view the informal sector with 
contempt.’197 Hence, to be utilised adequately, negative attitudes, perceptions, policies and 
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regulations have to be changed. In order to harness the potential this sector possesses, it 
needs to be viewed as contributing to overall economic development. 
 
In adopting the IS strategy in urban poverty alleviation, ‘it is imperative that these 
constraints be recognised and addressed. It is also important to note that urban poverty 
alleviation cannot be achieved solely through informal sector initiatives, and other 
complementary strategies have to be formulated and implemented. For the informal sector 
to play an effective urban poverty alleviation role there is need for a review of policies and 
regulations and other constraints facing operators. It is also through the organised efforts of 
the informal sector operators themselves that lasting improvements to their situation can 
be realised.’198 Therefore, local and central authorities have to partner with non-state actors 
such as, private organisations, non-governmental organisations, and various CSOs in order 
to fully realise the potential of this sector. Local authorities in all provinces could adopt a 
model like the Informal Sector Training and Resources Network (ISTARN) in Masvingo. This is 
‘a brainchild of a bilateral agreement between governments of Zimbabwe and Germany … 
ISTARN provides training support in relevant skills and it has also set up a revolving fund for 
the operators.’199 Such partnerships can facilitate access to credit and capital; provide 
informal sector operators with additional or specialised skills, and even the formalisation of 
some enterprises. 
 
Therefore, the government cannot continue to ignore or thwart efforts of informal sector 
enterprises as it has done in the past. Poverty is a major social problem in the 21st century 
and due to hardships faced in the macroeconomic environment, many have to create their 
own sources of livelihood. ‘To bring about … development the obstacles that militate against 
the informal sector in poverty alleviation must be addressed. There is need to transform the 
informal sector in order to play a poverty alleviation role through the extension of credit 
                                                             
198 Loc cit. 
199 Ibid. p. 16. 
63 | P a g e  
 
and training facilities, mobilisation of non-governmental organisations and other agencies in 
… poverty alleviation and to put in place a coherent set of policies and regulations.’200 
 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter has looked at the informal sector as an engine of growth and development. It 
mainly looked at the informal sector contributing positively to economic growth and 
development through job and wealth creation, the informal transfer of remittances, and the 
informal sector as a poverty alleviation strategy. It began by looking at debates regarding 
the informal sector as a mechanism that can enhance economic growth. One school of 
thought argues that the informal economy can positively contribute to economic growth 
and development while another argues that the informal sector contributes negatively to 
economic growth. This chapter also looked at the informal economy enhancing economic 
growth in terms of job creation and the informal transfer of remittances which has been a 
great source of foreign currency for the government and citizens in Zimbabwe. Lastly, this 
chapter looked at the informal sector as a strategy for poverty alleviation. Through the right 
policies, removal of stereotypes and regulatory mechanisms this sector can contribute 
positively to overall economic growth and development especially during the ongoing 
reconstruction process. The conclusion this chapter made is that the informal sector can and 
does make a significant contribution to job creation, income support and poverty 
alleviation. The next chapter will attempt to locate the informal sector in current 
reconstruction debates. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE INFORMAL SECTOR AND THE CURRENT 
RECONSTRUCTION PROCESS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
On the 15th of September 2008, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) Mutambara 
and Tsvangirai factions along with the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front 
(ZANU-PF) signed a Global Political Agreement (GPA) under the SADC protocol, which ended 
the political stalemate. At the African Union summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, former South 
African President, Kgalema Motlante, (who was at that time Chair of SADC) appraised the 
GPA as an “African solution to the African problem”.201 On the 11th of February 2009, the 
Government of National Unity came into effect as the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime 
Minister and Ministers from both MDC factions were sworn into cabinet. The realities and 
responsibilities facing the GNU are indeed challenging. Creating a democratic environment 
and turning around the collapsed economy are not tasks of small magnitude. Kamidza states 
that, ‘the economic collapse has its roots in the decade long mismanagement of fiscal and 
monetary policies, which unfortunately succeeded in reducing productive capacities of all 
the sectors in the economy while increasing monetary disbursement to finance public 
expenditures.’202 
 
The Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP) document states that, ‘at the 
epicentre of the economic crisis, have been unprecedented levels of hyper-inflation, 
sustained period of negative Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates, massive 
devaluation of the currency, low productive capacity, loss of jobs, food shortages, poverty, 
massive de-industrialisation and general despondency. It is, therefore, a fundamental task 
of the new Inclusive Government to address the above and to resuscitate and rehabilitate 
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the economy. In addition, the new Inclusive Government has to attend to the major 
imperative of nation building and national healing.’203 However, Worrall picks up on this 
point and argues that there is ‘absolutely no likelihood of any Zimbabwean political party or 
combination of parties being able to remedy the situation.’204 For instance, ‘the extent of 
hunger and breakdown in the social service sector has left the country with the most serious 
humanitarian crisis in its history … The situation will continue to be gloomy next year 
(2010).’205 Hence, the economic and political meltdown has been explosive as it has been 
socially harmful. A clearer picture of the economic meltdown and the challenges the 
Inclusive Government is faced with have been outlined in Chapter one to three. Despite the 
fact that the GNU has committed itself to nationwide reconstruction, building and healing, 
‘critics are still sceptical about ZANU-PF’s sincerity with regard to implementing an inclusive 
Government given its past open violation of the spirit of both the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) and the GPA with impunity.’206 
 
In the past year, relations between the various parties have ranged from accommodation to 
boycotting of Parliament to complete disregard of the agreement. In addition, past recovery 
policy documents and macro-economic blueprints since the late 1990s have had little 
impact in mitigating the effects of the economic crisis, leaving critics with more reason to 
worry. They have failed to stimulate economic growth and improve the socio-economic 
conditions of the people. Given the above, can an Inclusive Government provide the 
confidence-building measures necessary to harness domestic, regional and foreign actors in 
support of the economic recovery?’207 Kamidza states that, any success at nationwide 
reconstruction will to a large extent be dependent upon the depth of internal political 
adjustments as well as the manner in which various constituencies or stakeholders will be 
consulted by the new leadership.208 
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Kamidza also states that the fear amongst citizens and other interested parties in the GNU 
tackling nationwide reconstruction is summarised by the following questions: ‘what will be 
the nature, content and scope of re-engaging with the international community and 
collaborating with different stakeholders in support of the economic transition? What is the 
likelihood of mobilising unconditional foreign capital investment and multi-donor 
resources? Given that donors and foreign countries have already tabled their conditions of 
engagement, is the new administration ready to play ball or galvanise the collective wisdom 
of all stakeholders? Where does the ordinary citizen fit in this process?’209 Of importance to 
this paper is the question that, where does the informal sector fit into ongoing debates on 
reconstruction?  
 
As a sector that has played a crucial role in the country’s macro-economic environment, 
what policies and strategies have been put in place to organise, formalise,  harness the 
potential of, and partner with this sector? As was mentioned earlier, Governments often 
respond to the informal sector in various ways that often do not support the IS, but it is 
important to realise the value of this sector as it can be used as an engine for growth in the 
current reconstruction process. McClain et al state that, ‘nation-states generally take three 
approaches to dealing with informal economy activity that takes place in the economic 
domains usually subject to regulation: ignoring its existence, making an effort to control it, 
or legalising it.’210 
 
According to Qotho Microfinance Advisory Limited, ‘supporting the informal sector is critical 
to Zimbabwe’s economic recovery because historically it employed and supported the most 
people. Government, private sector and civil societies must all help to achieve this aim.’211 
The Ministry of Small, Micro and Medium Enterprises (SMMEs) notes that, ‘in the Zimbabwe 
situation, the development of small businesses (of which the informal economy can be 
classified under) is regarded as crucial for the achievement of broader development 
objectives such as poverty alleviation, spreading employment to rural areas, improving the 
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situation of women and increasing indigenous ownership of investment in the economy.’212 
At this crucial stage where the Government is undertaking nationwide reconstruction, 
policies dealing with the IS should be given careful thought. In as much as the long-term 
existence of the informal economy may not be entirely desirable, putting in place 
constructive policies that will harness the potential of this sector now may prevent the 
perpetuation of underdevelopment and lead to sustainable development.  
 
That is, ‘enterprises in the informal economy have an entrepreneurial potential that could 
flourish if some major obstacles to growth were removed. Furthermore, even if only a 
fraction of informal enterprises would have the pass to upgrade, it would probably 
contribute substantially to increased economic growth.’213 Therefore, the aim of this 
chapter is to locate the informal sector in Zimbabwe in current reconstruction debates as 
well as within the larger economic debates. It is important to note that in gathering data for 
this chapter, the main challenge faced was finding information that locates the informal 
sector in the current reconstruction process. However, the Ministry of SMMEs is using the 
National Policy document drafted and approved in 2007 to incorporate the informal sector 
in the reconstruction process. Therefore, this chapter mainly draws on data presented in 
this policy document. 
 
 
 
4.2 Steps the Government has taken to Partner with the Informal Sector 
 
In the past, the Government has set up policies and strategies that deal with Small, Micro 
and Medium Enterprises (SMMEs). The ‘Governments support for this sector has been 
repeatedly enunciated in various policy documents such as “Framework for Economic 
Reform”, the “Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation” (ZIMPREST), 
and the Economic Recovery Programme.’214 However, most of these policies formulated in 
the 1990s, did not turn out to be very successful and also due to budgetary constraints, as a 
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result of macroeconomic problems, the Government was unable to fully harness the 
potential of this sector. According to the Minister of Small, Micro and Medium Enterprises 
Development, Sithembiso Nyoni, in recent years there has been increasing awareness and 
recognition of the role played by small and medium enterprises and their contribution to 
the economy.’215 In the past, micro-enterprises of which the informal sector is classified 
under216 were viewed as a nemesis of the states goals of economic development. But in 
current reconstruction debates, the informal sector is (once more) slowly being viewed as a 
potential engine for growth. 
 
‘The Ministry of Industry and International Trade in conjunction with the Ministry of Youth 
Development, Gender and Employment Creation established a Policy Document for the 
support of Small, Micro and Medium Enterprises (SMMEs) ... The document maps out 
strategies to address various obstacles facing the small business operator … and providing 
an enabling environment for them to realise their full potential.’217 The National Policy and 
Strategy for SMMEs in Zimbabwe, sets out specific strategies and outlines the framework for 
coordinating, implementing, and monitoring SMME support mechanisms which will enhance 
the growth and development of this sector. Thus, ‘the main goal of SMME Policy is to 
generate sustainable jobs, reduce poverty, stimulate growth and generate foreign currency 
earnings thereby contributing to the well being of all Zimbabweans.’218 
 
Drafted in 2007, the government was unable to fully realise the goals and objectives of the 
National Policy for SMMEs due to immense political, social and economic challenges. It is 
within the current reconstruction process, that the government (has revisited the policy 
document and) through the various ministries mentioned above, is intent on fully realising 
the potential of SMMEs. Since opportunities in the formal sector are shrinking, the Ministry 
of SMMEs has realised that there is a need to turn and focus on SMMEs (inclusive of the IS) 
as the potential for investment and for making a meaningful contribution to employment 
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generation.219 It is envisioned that the National Policy will: ‘ensure coordination of the 
different policies and programmes at national level, provide an appropriate institutional 
mechanism to facilitate SMME development effects, commit SMME growth over the long 
term rather than dependence on any quick-fix solutions, set priorities and the appropriate 
allocation of limited public resources, rationalise support programmes, coordinate resource 
mobilisation strategies, and delegate tasks, responsibility and accountability.’220 If the 
National Policy is managed, coordinated and implemented in an effective manner, the 
informal sector along with Small and Medium Enterprises could indeed be an engine for 
growth. 
 
Internationally, the importance of SMMEs is also recognised with regard to their 
contribution to employment creation, innovation and a country’s GDP. For instance, ‘small 
businesses in America generate more than half of the nation’s Gross Domestic Product, in 
India; the informal sector contributes 70% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product … 
Japanese SMMEs are actively cultivated by the “Keiretsu”, who maintain a strategy of 
contracting out, the German “Mittlesand” is often referred to as the “engine for growth”, 
the small proprietorial business sector in northern Italy is politically powerful and the source 
of major innovation in the Italian economy.’221 Thus, like other states in the world, the 
Inclusive Government acknowledges that ‘the development of the SMME sector is also 
regarded as crucial for the achievement of broader development objectives. It is envisaged 
that support to the SMME sector can achieve many other goals such as poverty alleviation, 
spreading employment to rural areas and improving the situation of women’ and other 
vulnerable groups.222 
 
The Ministry of SMMEs has cited the benefits of developing this sector as: mobilising and 
stimulating the vast potential for entrepreneurship, increasing indigenous ownership and 
investment in the economy, increasing the nation’s wealth via fuller utilisation of the 
country’s human resource capitalisation, creating and increasing employment opportunities 
for large numbers of people, developing an economic structure that is self-sustaining with a 
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high degree of sectoral linkages, and facilitating a wide economic base and the creation of 
wealth.223 The 2008 UNDP Comprehensive Economic Recovery in Zimbabwe discussion 
document states that, ‘to sustainably address the challenges posed by unemployment, 
under-employment and widespread poverty, it is necessary to fully integrate disadvantaged 
and vulnerable groups such as youths, women, people with disabilities …’224 as well as other 
sectors of the economy like the IS. Hence, through the promotion and development of 
SMMEs and various self employment programmes the GNU can deepen its partnership with 
the IS as it strives towards sustainable development. The macroeconomic policies the new 
government will set in place will have a direct bearing on whether this sector can flourish 
and contribute to economic growth during the reconstruction process. 
 
To date, the government has various support programmes in place. These include, the 
Zimbabwe Development Bank, Credit Guarantee Company of Zimbabwe, Small Enterprise 
Development Cooperation (SEDCO), Agricultural Development Bank (Agribank), and the 
Venture Capital Company. However, their support has been piecemeal and 
uncoordinated.225 The Ministry has also put in place ‘strategies to revise laws and 
regulations to reduce the burden of doing business … Policy makers will ensure that 
regulations in place are pro-active and do not impose disproportionate costs. Legal 
instruments and regulations will be drawn up to ensure minimal administrative work,’226 
thereby simplifying complex regulations and also creating an enabling environment for 
SMMEs to thrive. In particular, ‘the Small Business Act will be put in place as a legal 
instrument to facilitate the growth of the sector. This act will be used as a basis to define 
SMMEs and to facilitate provision of support targeted to either individual entrepreneurs or 
associations within this sector.’227 
 
In addition, the Ministry of SMMEs has committed itself to engage in capacity building 
programmes and has partnered with the Ministry of Industry and International Trade, 
Ministry of Youth Development, Gender and Employment Creation, Small Business Advisory 
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Council (SBAC), Small Business Authority (SBA), Zimbabwe Investment Centre, Financial 
Institutions to mention few. Through these partnerships or relationships ‘entrepreneurs will 
be encouraged to establish sector focussed associations, such as the Zimbabwe Apex of 
Informal Sector Association … that will facilitate networking and access to support packages 
targeted at this sector.’228 Appendix one, shows a summary of SME enterprises by sector 
and province for the period July – October 2009. This indicates that the new government is 
indeed committed to an all inclusive strategy during the reconstruction process and has 
taken concrete steps in trying to harness the potential and partner with the informal sector. 
One key challenge the GNU will face in trying to establish a working relationship with the 
informal sector is organising it so that it becomes easier for government and other 
stakeholders to partner with this sector.  
 
In attempting to organise the IS, Birchall notes that four basic attitudes can be identified by 
especially trade unions who are tasked to organise this sector. These are ‘the belief that the 
sector is a transitory and not an enduring, even growing element of the new economies, 
they believe that since they face problems in maintaining and mobilising membership in the 
formal sector, they are not in a position to dedicate scarce resources to the informal; they 
have difficulties in locating informal sector workers and come up against barriers to 
organising, so that they feel it is not an efficient use of resources; self-employed workers are 
seen as entrepreneurs and not potential trade union members.’229 Birchall further states 
that there is ‘a new emphasis on sustainable cooperatives, promoted through participatory 
development techniques rather than top-down Government-led intervention.’230 However, 
its steps in trying to incorporate and partner with the IS/SMMEs is commendable in trying to 
achieve economic growth and sustainable development. 
 
 
Therefore, in the current reconstruction process, the expected outcomes are for an 
economy that among other things, is targeted at poverty reduction, job and employment 
creation, inward looking and people centred, generating confidence and inter-sectoral 
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linkages to mention a few. The GNU has taken steps to integrate the informal sector in 
larger economic debates. However, a challenge to economic recovery will be the political 
stalemate between MDC and ZANU-PF. Failure to implement or agree on unresolved 
matters may have a direct bearing on economic progress. But as the reconstruction process 
continues, Government should continue to step up its efforts in trying to harness the 
potential and partner with the informal sector. 
 
4.3 Summary 
 
This chapter has tried to locate the informal sector in the current reconstruction process. It 
began by noting that the Inclusive Government is faced with a difficult task ahead of it, due 
to the effects the economic crisis had on the political and social fabric of society. Various 
scholars have suggested that the informal economy has immense entrepreneurial potential 
and can substantially contribute to economic growth and development. This chapter went 
on to look at the steps the Government has taken to partner with the informal sector. The 
Ministry of SMMEs was identified as the key ministry that is dealing with this sector. The 
Ministry has revisited the National Policy and Strategy document drafted in 2007 that seeks 
to realise the potential of this sector and as indicated in appendix one, the Ministry has 
made considerable progress in realising the goals and objectives of this document. 
Government is aware of the contribution and role that the informal sector can play in the 
reconstruction process, however, the key challenges will be organising this sector and 
dissolving the political stalemate between parties of the GNU.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, this research report has attempted to examine whether Zimbabwe’s informal 
economy can be used as a means for sustainable development in the current reconstruction 
process. This research report argued that the informal sector can be used as a means for 
sustainable development and can contribute to overall economic growth in the country. 
Naude states that, ‘a growing number of people in fragile states are entering post-conflict 
eras, and are having high expectations of economic development, not only to improve their 
material conditions, but also to consolidate and ensure sustainable peace. It is not surprising 
therefore that, in a context wherein state capacity is often lacking, and liberalisation and 
other market-oriented reforms dominate the agenda, there are high expectations that 
entrepreneurship can make an important contribution towards economic growth and 
development.’231 Though Zimbabwe cannot be classified under post-conflict states, it can be 
considered as a fragile state due to the economic crisis and political instability that occurred 
in the last decade. 
 
Chapter one, outlined the theoretical and analytical framework that informed this report. It 
mainly drew on work from three schools of thought on the informal sector. These are the 
dualist school, the structuralist school and the legalist schools of thought. The dualist model 
was popularised by the ILO in the 1970s and argues that the informal sector acts as a buffer 
or safety net in times of economic distress. That is, dualists widely believe that informal 
firms are not a threat to the formal sector as they contribute positively to economic growth. 
They believe that informality will diminish with time as certain levels of economic growth 
and development are attained.232 Once a country has achieved relative levels of industrial 
development, this model argues that the informal sector will disappear. 
 
The structuralist model mainly looks at the link between the formal and informal sectors.  
Prior to the findings of the structuralist theory, it was widely believed that the informal and 
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formal sectors existed separately. However, this model corrected this view and argued that 
the two sectors are inextricably linked and should not be perceived as separate or distinct. 
Structuralists argue that, ‘proper fiscal and regulatory reform and reduction of entry barriers 
to formalisation supplemented with necessary credit would facilitate their entry into the 
formal sector and subsequently contribute to economic growth.’233 Unlike the dualist model 
that argues that the informal sector would disappear once modern industrial development 
was attained, this theory argues that the informalisation is a normal process that occurs in 
modern industrial development. It was popularised by scholars like Alejandro Portes in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. The legalist school of thought argues that Government rules and 
regulations are responsible for stifling private enterprises and due to the cumbersome and 
burdensome process of formalisation, small and medium operators opt to remain informal. 
It emphasizes the need for governments to revise established rules and regulations and seek 
new comprehensive approaches that allow the informal sector to flourish and contribute 
positively to economic growth. This school of thought was popularised by Hernando de Soto 
in the 1980s and 1990s. Chapter one also provided a brief outline of Zimbabwe’s macro-
economic environment. 
 
Chapter two, looked at how the informal sector evolved to where it is today. It traced the 
history of the informal sector from 1980 to date. However, the growth of the informal 
sector is to be understood within the larger economic environment as certain macro-
economic policies have had a direct influence on the rise of this sector. Chapter two was 
divided into three phases, namely, 1980-1990, 1991-2000, and 2001-2009. In the first phase, 
this report noted that there were traces of the informal sector but it was not a prevalent 
feature. Due to protectionist and interventionist policies in the early years of the country’s 
independence, the government was able to sustain high levels of economic growth. 
Furthermore, the new government was intent on re-dressing inequities that had occurred 
during the colonial era and thus introduced the Growth with Equity Policy in 1981. This saw 
the government acting as employer of last resort and majority of the population being 
employed in the public sector.  
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By the late 1980s, the very same protectionist and interventionist policies which allowed the 
economy to perform relatively well began to slow growth. At this time, the economy began 
to show signs of distress. In 1991, as way to boost economic growth the government 
introduced a WB and IMF structural adjustment programme termed ESAP. The programme 
promised to increase growth and also to absorb majority of the workforce from the public 
sector into the private sector. The government was forced to cut down on social spending, 
privatise parastatals among other things. However, ESAP (also coinciding with drought in 
1992 and 1995) had a disastrous impact on the country and did not deliver on its promises 
and by 1995 the employment rate had risen to 40% from 10% in the 1980s. Most scholars 
argue that this period was synonymous with the rise of the informal sector. Due to high 
rates of public sector retrenchments, rural-urban migration, most people found themselves 
engaging with the informal sector in order to survive. 
 
During the 1990s, realising the informal sector’s ability to act as a buffer and safety net, 
government supported this sector. Other economic blueprints like ZIMPREST were 
introduced during this period but did not yield much and by year 2000, the country’s 
economy was on the brink of collapse. The last phase saw the informal economy rising to 
epic proportions. The employment rate during this period is estimated between 80% and 
94%. As a means to survive the vast majority of the population has been forced to engage 
with this sector. Various scholars mention that the informal sector during this era was the 
lifeblood of the nation and also prevented the economy from absolute collapse. Various 
events fuelled the economic meltdown. These include the IMF riots, payouts to war 
veterans, the country’s involvement in the Great Lakes conflict, the fast track land reform 
programme, the Governments alienation from the West, and sanctions to mention a few. All 
these factors led to a drop in the country’s productive capacity, mass unemployment, and 
high inflation rates which led to a rise in the informal sector. 
 
During this period, government reflected a hostile attitude towards the informal sector as is 
illustrated through the nationwide clean-up campaign. The Centre for International Trade, 
Economics and Environment notes that, ‘in many instances, different terms such as the 
informal shadow, parallel or black economy among others are used interchangeably 
wherein informal sector operations are not distinguished from illegal and underground 
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production activities. Informal sector operations pertain to activities where a legal 
counterpart exists and are not always performed with the deliberate intention of evading 
taxes and infringing labour and other regulations, hence departing from the concepts of 
illegal and underground production. Therefore, most informal sector activities in developing 
countries are not underground and not illegal as these are undertaken as measures for 
survival.’234 However, during the clean-up campaign the informal sector was believed to be 
a breeding ground for criminals and the hub of illegal and criminal activity. Though some 
elements of the IS where illegal and even criminal, most activities involved ordinary people 
trying to eke out a living. Naude states that, ‘where economies are failing, entrepreneurship 
is often a source of survival as well as autonomy where states are under-performing – a fact 
that is sometimes under-appreciated when governments harass informal traders.’235 This 
sector served a very functional role as it provided goods and services that were no longer 
available in the formal sector.  
 
Against this backdrop, chapter three assessed the informal sector as an engine for growth and 
development. This chapter identified three main areas where the informal economy has and can 
contribute to economic growth. These are the informal transfer of remittances, the informal sector 
as an employment generating mechanism, and the informal sector as a poverty alleviation strategy. 
The informal sector can contribute to development and peaceful transition of government in fragile 
states. That is, informal traders ‘create jobs, provide diversity, assume risk, provide goods and 
services, including even public goods, as well as provide an environment for learning, 
experimentation, innovation and competition.’236 Even though the government is now engaged in 
nationwide reconstruction, the effects of the policies of the last ten years still resonate with most 
people as they still struggle to make ends meet. Thus, with the proper policies in place, this sector 
can contribute to economic growth that leads to sustainable development. Hence, ‘development 
practitioners and Governments should strive to find policies and programs which harness 
the potential of this sector.’237 
 Chapter four, attempted to locate the informal sector in the current reconstruction process. 
That is, what steps has the Inclusive Government taken to harness the potential off and 
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partner with this sector?  It should be noted that, in gathering data for this chapter, the 
main challenge faced was finding information that locates the informal sector in the current 
reconstruction process. Therefore, this chapter largely drew on data presented in the 
National Policy document on SMMEs.  This document was drafted in 2007, but in the 
current reconstruction process, government has decided to revisit this document and 
implement the goals and objectives outlined. Appendix one indicates the progress 
government has made in ensuring SMMEs are integrated in the reconstruction process. 
 
Chapter four also identified some of the steps government has taken to integrate the 
informal economy in the current reconstruction process. The Ministry of Industry and 
International Trade, the Ministry of Youth Development, Gender and Employment Creation 
and the Ministry of Small, Micro and Medium Enterprises have been working together to 
put in place policies, strategies and support mechanisms that will allow this sector to 
flourish and contribute to employment creation, poverty alleviation, entrepreneurial 
development to mention a few. The government is now aware of and recognises the 
potential of this sector as an engine for growth in the country.  
 
Therefore, from the analysis provided in this report it is clear that the informal economy in 
Zimbabwe can be used as a means for sustainable development in the current 
reconstruction process. Frye and Shleifer ‘classify governments as either providing an 
“invisible hand”, a “helping hand”, or a “grabbing hand” as far as the private sector 
development is concerned. For fragile and post-conflict states, the fundamental long-term 
challenge is to change governments from being invisible or grabbing hands towards helping 
hands … A precondition for pro-growth entrepreneurship in post-conflict societies is 
therefore that governance and transactional trust be restored.’238 The Inclusive Government 
will need to come to a resolution regarding the various disagreements between the parties 
in order for complete recovery, reconstruction, nation building and healing to occur. As the 
GNU tackles the challenges of economic recovery, the informal sector can be used as one of 
the tools and mechanisms that can drive economic growth in the country. 
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